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Between-the-Wars Social Thought

I.

INTRODUCTION

My thesis is unsurprising. Karl Llewellyn, who believed that law
should reflect the reality of society, was influenced by contemporary
social science.
Llewellyn and his contemporaries, collectively
referred to as "Legal Realists," were a group of elite academics, from
Yale, Harvard, and Columbia.' These Legal Realists were generally
modernist, leftist, reform-oriented, and influenced by anthropology
and institutional economics.
In retrospect, Llewellyn's statement that the Realists did not have
a normative program is a questionable one,2 since many of the
Legal Realists accepted positions in Franklin D. Roosevelt's (F.D.R.)
administration. For example, William 0. Douglas served as Chair
of the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC),' Jerome Frank
served as General Counsel to the Agriculture Adjustment Administration (AAA) and the Federal Surplus Relief Corporation,
Special Counsel to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and
Commissioner and Chair of the SEC,4 and Herman Oliphant, acted
as an advisor to the Department of the Treasury and other agencies.'
Karl Llewellyn himself stridently supported President
Roosevelt's plan to make certain reforms to the Supreme Court6 and

' These Legal Realists included: William 0. Douglas, see infra note 3 and accompanying
text; Herman Oliphant, see infra note 5 and accompanying text; Underhill Moore, see infra
note 31; see also infra note 5 (discussing Legal Realists W.W. Cook, Samuel Klaus, T.R.
Powell, and Wesley Sturges).
2 "When the matter of program in the normative aspect is raised, the answer is: there is
none." Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44
HARV. L. REv. 1222, 1254 (1931) [hereinafter Realism].
3 4 THE NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA MICROPAEDIA 197 (15th ed. 1994).
4 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 215-17 (Supp. VI 1980).
5 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 500-501 (Supp. II 1958); see Dr. W. W. Cook Dies;

Professor of Law, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1943, at 21 (identifying Cook as a member of the
Committee on Practice of the U.S. Treasury from 1934-43); Samuel Klaus, 58, U.S. Legal
Advisor, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1963, at 17 (identifying Klaus as a legal adviser to F.D.R.);
Underhill Moore, Law Professor, 69, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1949, at 23 (identifying Moore as a
special mediation representative of the public National War Labor Board); T.R. Powell Dies;
Law Professor, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1955, at 27 (identifying Powell as a former special
assistant to the Attorney General of the United States and a member of F.D.R.'s five-man
Emergency Fact-Finding Board); Wesley Sturges, Educator,69, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11,
1962, at 88 (identifying Sturges as the chief representative of the Office of Economic Warfare
for French North and West Africa during World War II).
" Llewellyn wrote, "[w]hatever bill comes out of committee backed by the President needs
fighting support." Karl N. Llewellyn, A United Front on the Court, 144 THE NATION, Mar.
1937, at 288, 289.
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wanted a constitutional amendment "expressly and unequivocally
enlarging the powers of Congress-preferably under the generalwelfare clause."7
Karl Llewellyn and his contemporaries were more reformist than

is generally believed. These Legal Realists drew on a reservoir of
contemporary social thought that supported reform intended to
combat the conditions of the Depression.8 Seen in this light, the
first versions of the Uniform Commercial Code (hereinafter UCC),
in 1940 and 1941, may be viewed as part of the New Deal era's
struggle to restore prosperity.
This Article reconsiders Llewellyn's ideas and the UCC in light of
the thinkers that influenced Llewellyn.9 Two themes characterized
the social science and society contemporary with the creation of the
UCC in 1940 and 1941. First, many perceived a need for modernization in the face of the breakdown of the old order. Second, many
conceived of the social order as being composed of groups or
institutions, rather than individuals.
This Article, which is
organized around these themes, discusses how the first drafts of the
UCC fit into the New Deal era of social and economic reform,
specifically in the time between the invalidation of the National
Industrial Recovery Act in 193510 and Pearl Harbor. Examined in
this context, the UCC was not merely a codification of forgotten

7 Id.

8 In 1937 Llewellyn suggested four "cures" to remove the common law from sales law: a
despot, such as Napoleon; a "guildish organization, such as trade associations;" a "caring" codedrafter such as David Dudley Field; and "the creation of some agency which serves in private
law as the cop serves in public law." Karl N. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society:
11, 37 COLUm. L. REV.341, 380 (1936) [hereinafter On WarrantyIII. "Such an agency not only
can take initiative when otherwise none will, but can become a focus and target for experts'
discussion." Id.
' Llewellyn did not claim originality. In fact, Llewellyn credited many scholars for his
ideas. Karl N. Llewellyn, The Effect of Legal Institutions upon Economics, 15 AM. ECON. REV.
665, 665 n.1 (1925) [hereinafter Effect]. Llewellyn admitted that "[tihe present paper makes
little claim to originality in its details. Much of the synthesis, too, has been indicated by
various writers from time to time. The author is particularly conscious of indebtedness to
Sumner, Holmes, Veblen, Commons, and Pound; but the borrowings are legion and often
unconscious." Id. Llewellyn also credited "Sumner and Max Weber, ... Corbin, Cook, U.
Moore, Oliphant, L. Frank, John Dewey ... and the Boas School" as being influential. Karl
N. Llewellyn, Law and the Modern Mind, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 82, 84 n.1 (1931) [hereinafter
Modern Mind].
10 See A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); see also
BERNARD BELLUSH, THE FAILURE Op THE NRA 169-70 (1975) (discussing Schecter and the

Supreme Court's unanimous decision to void Title I of the National Industrial Recovery Act
as an invalid delegation of legislative power to the President even though it only indirectly
affected interstate commerce).
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commercial law cases, but radical social and economic legislation
that Llewellyn designed to cure the ills of the Depression. This
Article concludes by explaining why the UCC's roots in the reformist
movements of the New Deal era have not been addressed previously.
II.

THE GOALS OF MODERNISM: EFFICIENCY, PRODUCTVITY,
ORDER

A.

Pragmatismand Optimism

I have characterized the time under study as "between-the-wars."
I do so advisedly. Llewellyn's Legal Realism represents the
modernistic break with Progressivism, which began to wane with
World War I. Although the relationship between the Progressives
and the succeeding generation is complex, the difference can be
summarized.
The Progressives were characterized by paternalism and belief in
the expansion of the public sector; educated and efficient administrators were their ideal governors." The experience of World
War I damaged Progressivism, casting doubt on its optimism, its
belief in progress, and its emphasis on moral values. 2 Earnestness
was replaced by cynicism and social responsibility by alienation,
while the Progressives' belief in virtuousness was seen as
hypocrisy." The Realists and the New Dealers replaced morality
with experimentation and empiricism and were skeptical about the
moral revolution that the Progressives wanted.' 4
The Legal Realists were a part of the intellectuals' rejection of
Victorian mores and ideas. As one scholar describes:

" See G. Edward White, From Sociological Jurisprudenceto Realism: Jurisprudenceand
Social Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, in PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL
THOUGHT 99, 104 (1978).
12 See id. at 116.
'3 See id. at 117.

" See id. Of course, as there was no absolute distinction between Progressive and New
Deal thought, my division is overly general. Such a distinction, however, helps to highlight
the unique aspects of the thought that influenced Llewellyn. See also RICHARD HOFSTADTER,
THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO FDR (1955) (discussing the period from 1890 to World
War II as an age of reform with three main episodes, including the agrarian uprising and
Populism of the 1890s, the Progressive movement which extended from 1900 to 1914, and the
New Deal of the 1930s); OTIS L. GRAHAM. JR., AN ENCORE FOR REFORM: THE OLD PROGRESSIVES AND THE NEW DEAL (1967) (discussing the origins of the New Deal and its continuity
with American political history).
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[diuring the nineteenth century, a large majority of
American academic and literary intellectuals served as
protectors of Victorian mores and ideas. By the 1920's,
however, most leading American intellectuals had announced
their rebellion against virtually the same conventions and
concepts....
...

Behind the shift lay an expansion of the parameters of

late nineteenth-century literary realism15 and naturalism and
of Victorian science and social science.
Professor White characterizes "between-the-wars" intellectuals as
being experimentalist, pragmatic and involved in the behavioral
sciences. 6 Furthermore, White claimed that these thinkers looked
to "hardboiled" men of action as their fantasy heroes. 7 Among
such intelligensia, realism, the hardboiled hero (embodied by
Humphery Bogart), and the New Deal all played a significant
role.' 8
This world-view ended around the time of World War II. At that
time, the Realists' moral relativism seemed too close to that of
contemporary amoral totalitarian governments. The economic
milieu of the Depression was being replaced by war-time prosperity
and a new group of thinkers came to dominate the social sciences. 19
Paradoxically, the mood of cynical resignation was accompanied by
a pervasive excitement. The time was generally seen as a new age,
full of new possibilities. A strong sentiment of optimism existed; if
only certain specific things were changed, the United States would
'5 STANLEY COBEN, REBELLION AGAINST VICTORIANISM: THE IMPETUS FOR CULTURAL

CHANGE IN 1920s AMERICA 36 (1991).
1

G. Edward White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration:JurisprudentialCriticismand

Social Change, in PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 136, 139 (1978).
17

18

Id.
Id. In discussing the characteristics of Realists, White writes:
In each of its major facets, Realism was a jurisprudence congenial to the America
of the early 1930's. In the first years of the Great Depression, Americans found that
one of the foundations of their society-the superiority of a loosely regulated
capitalist system and its accompanying mythologies (the sanctity of private property,
the virtue of self-help) had crumbled, and they had to find some way to rebuild in
sounder form. In undertaking this task, their environment was one of economic
deprivation; their mood, cynicism; their fantasy heroes, hardboiled meh of action;
their academic tools, the behavioral sciences; their philosophy of government,
experimentalist and pragmatic. The demythologizing tendencies of the Realists,
their commitment to decision-making by experiment, their preference for empiricism
rather than abstraction, even their questioning of moral absolutes, were in harmony
with the spirit of the first New Deal.

Id.

19 Id.
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enter into a new era of power and prosperity. The economy was in
shambles, and militarism, Fascism, and Nazism were growing
stronger daily. Yet, there was an excitement, reflected in Llewellyn's writings, in modern architecture, in industrial design, and in
the economic forecasts-an expectation that America was on the
verge of a breakthrough. There was a sense that if only the dead
hand of the past and its antiquated notions could be removed, then
society would reach new heights. Nothing seemed beyond fixing;
society could be understood, the economy could be put in order, and
the law could be made subservient to human purposes. But first,
outmoded ideas and practices had to be discarded.2"
This excitement about "the new" was pervasive. For example, in
1932, during the depths of the Depression, the Museum of Modern
Art put on an exhibition of avant-garde architecture entitled
"Modern Architecture-International Exhibition."2 1 This rejection
of the Beaux-Arts tradition signaled a turning point in American
Architecture.2 2 The original memorandum proposing the exhibition
spoke in terms parallel to Llewellyn's; it described the then current
state of architecture to be "chaos."23 Interestingly, this exactly
parallels the Legal Realist's ideology which found the state of the
law to be in "chaos" as well.24 In stripping away outmoded designs
and practices and imposing order, Modernism was doing away with

2 Llewellyn wrote of this Modernistic excitement:
Ferment is abroad in the law. The sphere of interest widens; men become
interested again in the life that swirls around things legal. Before rules, were facts;
in the beginning was not a Word, but a Doing....
The ferment is proper to the time. The law of schools threatened at the close of
the century to turn into words-placid, clearseeming, lifeless, like some old canal.
Practice rolled on, muddy, turbulent, vigorous. It is now spilling, flooding, into the
canal of stagnant words. It brings ferment and trouble. So other fields of thought
have spilled their waters in: the stress on behavior in the social sciences; their drive
toward integration; the physicists' reexamination of final-seeming premises; the
challenge of war and revolution. These stir. They stir the law. Interests of practice
claim attention. Methods of work unfamiliar to lawyers make their way in, beside
traditional techniques. Traditional techniques themselves are reexamined, checked
against fact, stripped somewhat of confusion.
Realism, supra note 2, at 1222.
21 Brendan Gill, The Sky Line: 1932, THE NEW YORKER, Apr. 27, 1992, at 94.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 96.
' Describing New York warranty law, Llewellyn stated: "What follows in New York is
chaos." On WarrantyII, supra note 8,at 365. Other thinkers also saw the current scene as
chaotic, for example, Hamilton's plan to reorganize the coal industry was to do away with the
"chaos" of free competition. WALTON H. HAMILTON & HELEN R. WRIGHT, A WAY OF ORDER FOR
BITuMNous COAL 24-29 (1928).
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the chaos of a prior time. In architecture, as well as law, an
integrated and rational mode of thought was needed.25
Modernism was influential in the legal arena as well. For
example, one of the Code's stated purposes was to "modernize the
law governing commercial transactions."26 Yet, what does it mean
to "modernize?" Though it is difficult in retrospect to determine
what the Modernistic program meant to those living in the thirties,
it was a pervasive movement in law, architecture, art, and design.
Modernism begins with the concept that the universe is unpredictable and that knowledge is evasive. From this concept follow two
controlling beliefs: That "'[tlo create [moral] values and garner
whatever knowledge is available, individuals must repeatedly
subject themselves ... to the trials of experience,' and that '[a]bove

all, [individuals] must not attempt to shield themselves behind
illusions
or gentility, as so many did during the nineteenth cen27
tury.'"

Legal Realism "with its emphasis on empirical and functional
methodologies and its thoroughgoing skepticism about moral or

' Phillip Johnson, who originally proposed the Museum of Modern Art's international
exhibition of modern art, stated:
There exists today, both in America and abroad, a marked activity in architecture.
Technical advances, new methods and fresh thoughts are solving contemporary
building problems in a manner that can truly be called modern. A progressive group

of architects, who have put aside traditional forms and are striking out along new
and vigorous lines, are at work. In America Frank Uoyd Wright has for decades
built modern houses. Raymond Hood is building the first really modern skyscrapers.
Neutra's sanatorium in California, and Samuel Insull's great housing project in
Chicago show the extent in the United States. ... Modem architecture is most
widely accepted in Germany. The city of Frankfurt has built tens of thousands of

cheap houses. Mies van der Rohe, one of the leaders of the movement, has complete
charge of the Berlin Building Exposition of 1931. The Bauhaus, a school founded by
the architect Gropius, is identified with modern movements in the arts and crafts.
... In Paris many mansions are modem, and Le Corbusier is now building a large
Salvation Army base there....
American architecture finds itself in a chaos of conflicting and very often
unintelligent building. An introduction to an integrated and decidedly rational mode
of building is sorely needed. The stimulation and direction which an exhibition of
this type can give to contemporary architectural thought is incalculable.
Gill, supra note 21, at 96.
U.C.C. § 1-102 (2)(a) (1994).
'7 G. Edward White, RecapturingNew Deal Lawyers, 102 HARv. L. REV. 489, 510 (1988)
(reviewing JOSEPH P. LASH, A NEW LOOK AT THE NEW DEAL (1988) and BRUCE ALAN MURPHY,
FORTAS: THE RISE AND RUIN OF A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE (1988)) (quoting Daniel Singal,
Towards a Definition of American Modernism, 39 AM. Q. 7, 15 (1987)).
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espistemological absolutes, would seem to be a quintessentially
modernist jurisprudence. " 28
Modernism rejected tradition and stripped away excessive,
outmoded, and unneeded practices and ideas. The Modernists'
excitement was accompanied by hubris: law, anthropology,
economics, and psychology could be used to understand and change
the world. Llewellyn called for a realistic jurisprudence that would
set goals, pass laws to reach these goals, and then monitor the
success of the legislation.2 9 This idealistic approach exemplifies the
modernist belief that social sciences could be used to change
society.3" Works from this era are devoid of doubt, of any sense
that society could not be totally understood, that the effects of
human action could be unknown and hard to measure, or that there
might have been intractable problems that were incurable."'

Id. at 514. White concluded that
[Tihe function of legal institutions, the composition of elite sectors of the legal
profession, and ideas about law itself were being explained in new terms in the
1930's. Of course, that decade was also witnessing unprecedented economic and
political instability, which not only helped create new roles for young lawyers
associated with the New Deal but also contributed to the more general sense that
the nation was encountering a revolutionary period in its history. There is little
wonder that survivors recall their entry into the New Deal as "heady" and
subsequent years as anticlimactic; little wonder that they perceived the cultural
atmosphere as fresh, exciting, and transformative.
They were entering a
professional world whose meaning was being redefined to conform to the tenets of
modernism, and were asked to put those tenets into practice. Having, in most cases,
little previous professional experience, and not being identified with "outmoded"
epistemological attitudes, they were "new" at a time when to be "old" was to be
"demoralized."
Id. at 516-17 (quoting Milton Katz, From Hoover to Roosevelt, in THE MAKING OF THE NEW
DEAL: THE INSIDERS SPEAK 121 (K. Louchheim ed., 1983)).
'
Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence - The Next Step, 30 HARV. L. REV. 431
(1930); see N.E.H. Hull, Reconstructing The Origins of Realistic Jurisprudence:A Prequel to
the Llewellyn - Pound Exchange Over Legal Realism, 1989 DuKE L.J. 1302 (describing the
origins of Llewellyn's theory of realistic jurisprudence).
Points One and Three of Llewellyn's "points of departure" for Realism were that law and
society were in flux. He stated that, "[tihe conception of society in flux, and in flux typically
faster than the law, so that the probability is always given that any portion of law needs
reexamination to determine how far it fits the society it purports to serve." Realism, supra
note 2, at 1236.
'o For example, Walton Hamilton prescribed a cure for the bituminous coal industry: a
national corporation that would mine and sell all coal in the United States. In addition, both
Jerome Frank's and Thurman Arnold's books explained that prosperity could be achieved just
by abolishing outmoded practices. HAMILTON & WRIGHT, supra note 24. See JEROME FRANK,
SAVE AMERICA FIRST: How TO MAKE DEMOCRACY WORK (2d ed. 1938); THuRMOND W. ARNOLD,
THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM (1937).
3' This hubris is exemplified by Underhill Moore, who, after being converted to Realism,
renounced his studies of banking law and devoted the rest of his life to a study of how New
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B. Proposalsfor Reform
Accompanying the excitement and hubris of Modernism was a
program focused on the goals of efficiency, high-speed production,
and the order and control necessary to achieve these goals. This
program manifested itself in industrial design, the factory system of
mass-production, industrial and commercial organization, and the
economic prescriptions of such legal writers as Arnold, Frank,
Hamilton, and Llewellyn. Its emblems were the streamlined trains,
planes, and automobiles of the thirties. 2 The cure for outmoded
non-productive practices was mass-production. The goal was a
smooth, efficient, and continuous regime that would flow without
chaotic disruptions.
1. The Rejection of the Common Law
Modernism was to supplant the old and eliminate the disruptive,
wasteful, and outmoded practices of earlier schools of thought.
Existing common law rights and the common law system were seen
as anachronistic and inconsistent with Modernism. Accordingly, the
UCC was written largely to supplant the common law by clearing
"statute and case law debris from the field so that commercial law
could follow the natural flow of commerce." 3

Haven, Connecticut's parking regulations actually worked. Not having the statistical expertise
necessary for his study, he spent the last part of his career observing illegal parking around
Yale. Far from being able to observe the actual consequences of national legislation, it was
impossible even to measure the impact of parking regulations in New Haven. John H.
Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: The Singular Case of
Underhill Moore, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 195, 264-303 (1980).
32 Donald Bush recognized this emerging trend stating:
The desire to perform actions quickly, easily and without disruptions is a
twentieth-century phenomenon evident in advanced-technology countries, especially
the United States. It is manifest both in processes and in objects. One can cite such
diverse examples as industrial time-motion studies, the superhighway system and
the modern compact kitchen. "Streamlining," a term with its origins in science, has
become commonplace in our language. It is synonymous with saving time and
energy, and streamlined forms are emblematic of speed and efficiency.
DONALD J. BUSH, THE STREAMLINED DECADE 1 (1975).
" Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudenceof The Uniform Commercial Code, 27
STAN. L. REV. 621, 631 (1975). Such a new system was needed because:
Traditional rights of market ordering no longer captured the category of fundamental interests; they were both over- and under-inclusive. Rights to governmental
assistance in the employment market, for example, were insufficiently protected by
the common law, as were the interests of the poor, consumers of dangerous food and
drugs, the elderly, traders on securities markets, and victims of unfair trade
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The common law and the traditional constitutional system were
not only inefficient, but were also incapable of protecting individuals.3 4 Arguing for the extension of warranty protection to
consumers of food and drink, Llewellyn described how the common
law was inadequate to cure the problem of the sale of bad food: "It
would seem obvious that if the risk of wholesomeness of canned or
package foods is to be shifted from the consumer, it could most
simply be spread, and even lessened, by throwing it on the house
under whose brand the food is sold." 5 The common law has only
negligence and warranty, with their problems of proof. "The judges
have done what they could with concepts; but the concepts have no
relation to a modern marketing system."3 6 Thus, the "struggle to
unhorse sales" arose in an attempt to get the "common" out of sales
law."
Of course, Llewellyn did see some good in the common law
tradition. He saw the common law as folk artifacts, working rules,
that had proven their worth over time.3 8 Llewellyn's characterization of the common law tradition as either part of the "grand"
or "formal" style permitted him to rescue the good parts of that
tradition and reject the bad as "formal." The legislator-social
engineer's job was to take the good, practical folkways and reject the
outmoded, whether they were the practices of merchants and

practices. At the same time, the common law system gave undue protection to
rights of private property.
Cass R. Sunstein, ConstitutionalismAfter the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REv. 421, 438 (1987).
Many Modernists felt that
the original constitutional structure, like the common law, was closely associated
with protection of the existing distribution of wealth and entitlements. In their
view, the system of separated functions prevented the government from reacting
flexibly and rapidly to stabilize the economy and to protect the disadvantaged from
fluctuations in the unmanaged market.
Sunstein, supra note 33, at 424.
" Effect, supra note 9, at 667 n.8.
36 Id.

" Karl N. Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales, 52 HARV. L. REV. 873 (1939)
[hereinafter Unhorse Sales].
8' Llewellyn described the common law as follows:
Pound has developed the idea of rules of law as "norms of conduct," as opposed to
standards of judgment or rules of decision of disputes. Commons has married this
concept with Sumner's "folkway," in his concept of working rules, which may be lawcreated, but more commonly are created by men's experiment, and only later taken
over by the law. Such seems to have been the almost universal process in primitive
law.
Effect, supra note 9, at 671 n.20 (citation omitted).
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common law rules of sales (as in the UCC) or the tribal law of
Native Americans.39
2. Meeting the Challenge of Mass-Production
Sales law had to change to fit the new industrial-commercial
regime of mass production. A stable, long-term relationship, based
on selling quality mass-produced merchandise in volume with the
observance of the group norms of decent merchants, was the way to
prosperity. To achieve this, however, the Code had to shift the
emphasis in sales law from the individual bargaining characteristic
of the horse-and-buggy age, to standardized, flexible, group
regulated, and "reasonable" contracts.
Long-range planning and the dealing necessary for a massproduction regime required a less rigid commercial law. In the
Second Draft of the Proposed Sales Act, Llewellyn discussed a
developing type of contract relationship "which deals with contract
less as an arm's-length single deal than as a getting together on a
type ofjoint-venture; an approach which greatly modifies the pattern
of sharp, whole-hog risk-placing which underlies most of our legal
doctrine of contract."4 ° Long-term relationships were to be the
norm. "Course of performance" was to be given legal effect to allow
for binding adjustments to be made; otherwise, "a change of
management, an extraneous personal friction, or even the resignation of a particular contact-man, can throw the machinery of
adjustment completely out of gear."4 ' Consequently, UCC section
2-208 takes a more flexible approach to contracts between merchants.42
In providing for flexibility, the UCC allowed merchants to cope
with the rapidly changing, chaotic commercial conditions charac-

39 See KARL N. LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICT AND
CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE (1941).
40 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, Report and Second

Draft: The Revised Uniform Sales Act (1941), reprinted in 1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
DRAFTS 269, 475 (Elizabeth S. Kelly ed., 1984) [hereinafter R.U.S.A ].
41 Id. at 476.
42 U.C.C. § 2-208 (1994). This section states:
Where the contract for sale involves repeated occasions for performance by either
party with knowledge of the nature of the performance and opportunity for objection
to it by the other, any course of performance accepted or acquiesced in without
objection shall be relevant to determine the meaning of the agreement.
Id. See U.C.C. §§ 2-209, 2-613, 2-614, 2-615 (1994) (illustrating the increased flexibility the
U.C.C. brings to commercial law).
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teristic of the Depression. This was necessary to preserve business
relationships so that commerce would not totally break down.
To achieve the productivity possible with mass-production, the
new age had to reject the old. For example, Walton Hamilton, who
had a significant influence on Llewellyn, 3 saw the new coal-mining
machines and the introduction of a factory system of industrial
organization as creating a new, efficient system of coal production.
The old craft-system was replaced with a single process which linked
every operation, "from face to tipple, into a single continuous
process."44
The UCC's expanded warranty of merchantability was adopted to
Llewellyn saw warranties as
facilitate production and prosperity.
"good business for the seller."45 To him, not having a warranty is
"primitive-mercantile," depending on individual bargaining which
just slows down the stream of commerce.46 Turnover produced
profits, and warranties facilitated this turnover.47
Llewellyn saw the purpose of contract law as achieving the
efficacy and efficiency of high-productive capacity and massproduction. In What Price Contract, he identified the "most vital
single aspect of contract law" as working against the contract
dodger, who interferes with the free flow of commerce."
Llewellyn wanted to substitute a standard of "mercantile performance" for that of the "perfect tender rule" of commercial law, which
gives the buyer the right to reject if the goods "fail in any respect to

48

See WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 93 (1973).

HAMILTON & WRIGHT, supra note 24.
4' In discussing warranties, Llewellyn stated:
The other pole is Utopia: value to the buyer. But, more or less approaching it,

there exists another view of the market: repeat orders are what a seller needs; to
stand behind words, and even behind wares-without-words, is good business for the
seller-and is therefore good policy for a court to encourage. Transactions look to

future delivery; even where they do not, they look to standard quality of goods
produced in mass and grade, and sold by name, brand, or description. Distribution

of goods is indirect, almost as of course; a buyer has only his dealer to trust to; it is
a dealer's business to know the goods he sells. As between dealers (even as between
retail-dealer and consumers), standing relations mean goodwill; and goodwill is what
makes turnover; and turnover is what makes the balance-sheet wax fat. Confidence,
not trickery, is the basis of prosperity.
Karl N. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society, 36 COLUM. L. REv. 699, 721 (1936)
[hereinafter On WarrantyI].

46 Id. at 723.
47 Id. at 721.
48 Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-AnEssay in Perspective, 40 YALE L. J. 704, 725

n.47 (1931) [hereinafter Contract].
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conform to the contract." 9 Llewellyn saw the perfect tender rule
as producing "a series of cases which do plain mercantile injustice
by permitting, on a falling market, or after buyer's change of mind,
rejection of a delivery which in all mercantile decency could be
expected as of course to fill the buyer's expectations."" Thus,
Llewellyn felt the perfect tender rule hindered the streamlined flow
of commerce:
Until our economy shifts its entire base, deals between
merchants will be first of all deals, looking toward movement
of goods and toward accounts in due course to be taken care
of. Adjustments of mercantile reasonableness will be proper
to be made where needed, but rejection or rescission for nontroubling defects will be bad policy.
Into such a picture, on the mercantile side, the Sales Act
requirement of exact compliance, coupled not only with
rejection but with rescission, cuts like an Arctic blast. It is
an invitation to throw back the risk of any dropping market
upon a seller who has performed as a reasonable seller
should perform.5 1
Llewellyn also saw the concept of title in sales law as a "wall" that
inhibited progress.5 2 Llewellyn was able to remove the "wall" of
title from commercial law.5"

49 U.C.C. § 2-601 (1994).
'o
"

R.U.S.A., supra note 40, at 382.
On Warranty II, supra note 8, at 389. Llewellyn did not get his way and the Code retains

the perfect tender rule for non-installment contracts. See U.C.C. § 2-601 (1994). However,
section 2-612 adopts a "substantial impairment" test and, as White and Summers point out,
the Code restricts section 2-601's perfect tender rule in many respects. JAMES J. WHITE &
ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 357 (3d. ed. 1988). They concluded that
"the law would be little changed if 2-601 gave the right to reject only upon 'substantial' nonconformity." Id. Thus, the result Llewellyn desired was nonetheless achieved.
2 In an article addressing these barriers, Llewellyn stated: "The mercantile rules of
law-and they are solid-which I have been describing make their way through this like ivy
through a wall, live, growing, spreading, finding cranny after cranny. But the wall is still
there, it is still in the way." Karl N. Llewellyn, Across Sales on Horseback, 52 HARv. L. REV.
725, 736 (1939) [hereinafter Horseback]. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Through Title to Contractand
Beyond, 15 N.Y.U. L. REV. 159 (1938) (questioning the use of title in the law of sales).
5' In discussing Llewellyn's effort, Ingrid Michelson Hillinger wrote:
Llewellyn had jettisoned title as a legal doctrine to allocate risk of loss. In its stead
Llewellyn had stated several rules based on different methods of delivery. Llewellyn
believed the pre-Code law regarding risk of loss had created uncertainty because
everyone knew the person who held title assumed the risk but no one knew who had
title. ...
Llewellyn believed that reliance on a monolithic concept to resolve
disputes involving different considerations "works out, no less, either to obfuscate
statement of results of rather reasonable decisions, or to misguide decision."

HeinOnline -- 59 Alb. L. Rev. 338 1995-1996

1995]

Between-the-Wars Social Thought

As for bargaining itself, individual dickering had to be replaced
with standardized contracts so that contracts could mass-produce
agreements efficiently and cheaply.54 Thus, the UCC is organized
to facilitate the flow of commerce by removing the impediments to
mass production and mass distribution through the use of flexible
contracting rules.55
III. PRAGMATISM, REALISM, AND VALUES
A.

Facts and Pragmatism

Modernistic thought placed a great emphasis on facts. It was
thought that focusing on "reality" would lead to clear thinking,
prosperity, and even virility. Legal Realism, as its name implies,
was (and is) concerned with facts and is characterized by pragmatism. Grant Gilmore described the turning of Realists to factual
social science: "It appeared, however, that the social scientists,
particularly the sociologists, had made great advances in techniques
of empirical research. If the law professors adopted those techniques, they could marshal the facts on which enlightened decision
depends."56
The valuing of empiricism to the extent of fact-worship was
pervasive in the twenties and thirties. The term realism, with its
qualifier "legal," indicates that it is but a subspecies of "Realism" in
literature (e.g., Zola, Drieser, Hemingway) and pragmatic social
science, or even of a practical, non-idealistic, hard-boiled attitude
Ingrid M. Hillinger, The Article 2 Merchant Rules: Karl Llewellyn's Attempt to Achieve the
Good, The True, The Beautiful in Commercial Law, 73 GEO. L.J. 1141, 1165-66 (1985) (quoting
Karl N. Llewellyn, Through Title to Contract and a Bit Beyond, 15 N.Y.U. L.Q. 159, 171
(1938)).
In discussing standardized contracts, Llewellyn stated,
[sitandardized contracts in and of themselves partake of the general nature of
machine-production. They materially ease and cheapen selling and distribution.
They are easy to make, file, check and fill. To a regime of fungible goods is added
one of fungible transactions-fungible not merely by virtue of simplicity (the overthe-counter sale of a loaf of bread) but despite complexity. Dealings with fungible
transactions are cheaper, easier. One interpretation of a doubtful point in court or
out gives clear light on a thousand further transactions. Finally, from the angle of
the individual enterprise, they make the experience and planning power of the high
executive available to cheaper help; and available forthwith, without waiting
through a painful training period.
Contract,supra note 48, at 731.
' See U.C.C. art. 2, pt. 2 (1994).
56 GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 89 (1977).
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towards life. Only looking at facts closely could save us from
chaos.57 There was an assumption that "facts" somehow spoke for
themselves; that facts unrelated to a system of values can give us
the answer. This pragmatism produced the UCC with rules
dependent on fact-specific determinations.
Llewellyn's first drafts of the Code provided for a jury composed
of merchants to make these determinations.58 Though the merchant jury was rejected, the fact finder must still make many factual
determinations under the present Article 2. For example, UCC
section 2-508(2) states: "Where the buyer rejects a non-conforming
tender which the seller had reasonable grounds to believe would be
acceptable with or without money allowance the seller may if he
seasonably notifies the buyer have a further reasonable time to
substitute a conforming tender."59 The application of this section
depends on five factual issues: (1) is the rejected tender "nonconforming;" (2) did the seller have reasonable grounds to believe it
would be acceptable; (3) did the seller "reasonably notify" the buyer;
(4) did the seller substitute a "conforming tender;" and (5) did he do
so in "reasonable time?" ° Along with the fact-based substantive
law, the thirties saw the creation of modern discovery, which turned
the litigation process into one that concentrated on factual investigation rather than formal pleading.6 '
Outside of the law, social thought in the thirties was characterized
by a rejection of formalism and a concentration on empiricism.6
One commentator characterizes the thinking of Dewey, Veblen and
'7 Llewellyn stated that, "[o]verwhelming in no less measure is the conviction that broad
forms of words are chaos, that only in close study of the facts salvation lies." Contract,supra
note 48, at 751.
58 R.U.S.A., supra note 40, at 535.
U.C.C. § 2-508(2) (1994).
'o See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 51, at 425-33 (discussing U.C.C. § 2-508 and its
implications); see also 1 THOMAS M. QUINN, QUINN'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE & LAW
DIGEST §§ 2-413 to 2-416 (2d ed. 1991) (discussing the "Time" Problem and the Right to, Adequacy, and Refusal of Cure, presented by U.C.C. § 2-508(2)).
"1 The introduction of extensive fact investigation has caused many problems and has
become the subject of an entire literature. One commentator stated:
The broad and flexible provisions in Rules 26 through 37 for discovery were the most
significant innovation in civil procedure when the rules were adopted in 1938. These
rules rested on a philosophy that prior to trial every party to a civil action is entitled to
the disclosure of all relevant information in the possession of any person, unless the
information is privileged.
CHARLES A. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 540 (4th ed. 1983) (citing 8 CHARLES A.
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2001 (1st ed. 1971)).
62 MORTON G. WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE REVOLT AGAINST FORMALISM 12
(1949).
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Holmes, three major influences on Llewellyn, as the revolt against
the formalistic and idealistic thinking of an earlier era.63 Dewey
and Veblen's empiricism, for example, contrasted with John Stuart
Mill's a priori reasoning from first principles of human behavior.64
The institutional economics of Veblen and Commons was based on
an actual observation of how groups worked. 5 Likewise, Commons
sought to identify the actual "working rules" that governed the
behavior of organizations and based his theory of reasonable value
on actual transactions. 6 Both Veblen and Commons rejected the
classical economists' positing of a priori assumptions such as the
wealth-maximizing individual.6 "
New Deal agencies were necessary to perform the factual
investigations required for effective empirical decisionmaking. Such
investigations enabled fact-gathering agencies to base their decisions
on reality, not opinion. Furthermore, their reality-based administration was practical, as opposed to an administration based on
the presumptions of classical economics.6 8
Other disciplines also reflected this empiricism.
Professor
Robinson, a psychology professor at Yale University, complained of
63

Id. at 15-27.
Id. at 22.

65 Id. at 7. One scholar explained:

Institutionalist economics, which flourished from the 1910s through the New Deal,
drew heavily from both the British classical tradition and the German Historical
School, as well as from the emerging theory of cultural evolution by natural
selection. Institutionalism rejected the classical view that a few simple concepts
could characterize all individual and institutional behavior.
In particular,
institutionalism flatly rejected the rationalistic psychology of self-interest that
dominated both classical and neoclassical economic theory. The institutionalists
believed that ideology, technology, history, habit, previous investment, and lack of
information or difficulty in communication drive both individual human motivation
and institutional structure.
Herbert Hovenkamp, The First GreatLaw & Economic Movement, 42 STAN. L. REv. 993, 1014
(1990) (citations omitted).
66 See JOHN R. COMMONS, THE ECONOMICS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 9-18 (1950).
67 See LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960 (1986) (describing the relation
of the Institutionalists and the Legal Realists). Professor Kalman notes the close connection
between "Institutionalism" and Legal Realism, stating that:
Veblen's institutionalism greatly influenced the realists: as one said, Veblen's
indictment of classical economists' search for "higher or definitive syntheses and
generalizations" and of classical economic theory's avoidance of "economic life
processes" in its development of "a body of logically consistent propositions
concerning the normal relations of things- a system of economic taxonomy" might
be "applied word for word to classical jurisprudence, if we merely substitute for the
terms 'economic' and 'economist' the terms legal' and jurist.'"
Id. at 19.
68 COMMONS, supra note 66, at 226-27, 234-35.

HeinOnline -- 59 Alb. L. Rev. 341 1995-1996

Albany Law Review

[Vol. 59

the law's ignorance of fact in favor of out-moded ideals.69 He
believed only intellectual honesty would avoid the problems caused
by the triumph of Modernism.7 ° Felix Cohen wrote a philosophic
counterpart to Robinson's manifesto.71 He used the philosophy of
logical positivism to critique law, finding formalistic legal concepts
to be "nonsense."72 As a Realist, he defined legal concepts on the
basis of the actual behavior of the courts.73 He believed the
question, "is there a contract?," could be broken up into various
factors which, in turn, referred to the actual behavior of the
courts.74 These factors included: what courts are likely to conclude
about a given transaction; what elements will be viewed as relevant
and important; how the courts have dealt with similar transactions;
and 7what
factors will argue for stare decisis and for change in the
5
law.

This approach parallels that of the UCC. In general, UCC
sections do not lay down formalistic rules;7" instead, they identify
the relevant and important elements that point the way to a
solution. For example, UCC section 2-602, which governs rejections,
states: "Rejection of goods must be within a reasonable time after

See Edward S. Robinson, Law-An Unscientific Science, 44 YALE L.J. 235 (1934).
7 Id. Robinson's article operates as a modernist manifesto, speaking of the social and
natural control gained by science in contrast to outmoded philosophy.
Today men watch with apprehension their own increasing mastery over physical
nature. They have the uneasy feeling that they are producing the machines that
must sooner or later be used by themselves to destroy themselves. They grow
morally earnest about the situation and write articles for the magazines. But too
rarely do they bring to bear upon this great social problem that intellectual
integrity, that frankness, that cool perspective of nature which has built the
machines of war and which is man's only hope in the control of himself. Solemn
men who go about the world preaching that there is something more to be relied
upon than facts, that there is something more necessary to human life than
intellectual honesty, are doing what they can to prevent the world from catching up
with science.
Id. at 246-47.
71 Felix Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense and the FunctionalApproach, 35 COLUM. L. REV.
809 (1935); see Joel Cornwell, From Hedonism to Human Rights:Felix Cohen's Alternatives to
Nihilism, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 197 (1995).
72 Cohen, supra note 71, at 812 ("Valuable as is the language of transcendental nonsense
for many practical legal purposes, it is entirely useless when we come to study, describe,
predict, and criticize legal phenomena.").
's Id. at 839.
74 Id.
69

71 Id.

Cf. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 12 (1930) ("What these officials do

about disputes is, to my mind, the law itself.").
76 For exceptions to this general proposition see U.C.C. § 2-201 (1994) (the Statute of
Frauds); U.C.C. § 2-321 (1994) (the definition of a C.I.F. contract).
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their delivery or tender. It is ineffective unless the buyer seasonably
notifies the seller.""
The factors to be considered are the
reasonableness of the time of rejection, measured from the delivery
or tender, and the reasonableness of the notification.7"
B.

Pragmatismand the Rejection of Idealism

Along with the emphasis on facts was a rejection of ideals, of the
"ought." There was a pervasive desire to at least separate questions
of value from questions of fact. One commentator stated that the
Realists "were skeptical about the place of moral and ethical 'oughts'
in the legal process ... [or] ... eschewed absolute moral values
altogether."7 9 An earlier generation's mixing of facts and values
was thought to have produced confusion and chaos. To Llewellyn,
law traditionally had ignored observation of facts:
[T]he first observation that one makes ... is that the
traditional approach to law has not been primarily concerned
with a science of observation at all. Its center has been
either an art (how to get disputes settled, how to get conduct
channeled) or else a philosophy (what ought to be done with
disputes, what ought to be done about channeling conduct)-or else an indiscriminate stew of both together. In
this, law calls up memories of the beginnings of economics,
political science, sociology 0°
Llewellyn's wish to separate facts and values and to base action
on actual experience was part of a pervasive attitude in the twenties
and thirties. One scholar characterized Thurman Arnold, one of the
more radical Legal Realists, as displaying "ingrained anti-intellectualism."8 1 At the least, the Legal Realists argued for the "te7' U.C.C. § 2-602 (1994).
78 Id.

79 WHITE, supra note 16, at 137.
'o KARL N. LLEWELLYN, Legal Tradition and Social Science Method-A Realists Critique,
in JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 77, 81 (1962).
" Neil Duxbury, Some Radicalism about Realism? Thurman Arnold and The Politics of
Modern Jurisprudence,10 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 11, 30 (1990).
Arnold, throughout his work, makes a crude distinction between the philosopher
and the technician. For him, the philosopher's pursuit is essentially contemplative
in nature. It is not in any sense practical. Hence, the existence of philosophy is
never considered to be anything more than futile ....

In contrast to the philosopher, the technician is the true agent of social
construction, fully aware "that political government is necessarily a dramatic
spectacle, that games are really important in the growth and development of
institutions, and that these games can be controlled."
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mporary divorce of Is and Ought".82 One needed values but had to
keep objective legal science and a critical theory of values separate
for clarity.
Perhaps some of this pragmatism comes from the scientific,
realistic approach of anthropology which seeks to understand each
culture on its own terms." Franz Boas, who was the Chair of the
Department of Anthropology while Llewellyn was at Columbia Law
School, warned against the nationalistic attitude stating:
its social standards are considered as more fundamental than
those that are general and human, or rather that the
members of each nation like to assume that their ideals are
or should be the true ideals of mankind. The late President
Wilson once gave expression to this misconception when he
said that, if we,-Americans,-hold ideals for ourselves, we
should also hold them for others, referring in that case particularly to Mexico.84
The era's pragmatic stance led to a hard-boiled rejection of woolyheaded intellectualism, particularly the type found in universities.
One of Llewellyn's unpublished papers reveals his views.8" Llewellyn believed "[ilntellectualism and culture generally, as at present
understood, are built on a foundation of: you work, you produce, you
pay, while I loaf, study, cultivate myself."8 This "leisure from
production" was obtained through the private endowment and public
support of institutions and students and private income from capital.
However, Llewellyn believed that all three of these foundations were
crumbling. Private income from capital was decreasing due to labor
participation in profits and government taxation of income and
inheritances.87 The demand for practicality and democracy and the
break-up of cultural tradition threatened public intellectual
institutions. Privately endowed institutions faced competition from
public universities, an increased unwillingness of donors to give (due

Id. at 31 (quoting THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE FoLKLORE OF CAPITALISM 343-44 (1937)).
2 Realism, supra note 2, at 1236.
13 FRANz BOAS, ANTHROPOLOGY AND MODERN LIFE 15-16 (1928).
84 Id. at 191.
"

Karl Llewellyn, Our Present Intellectualism (unpublished manuscript, on file with the

Albany Law Review) [hereinafter Intellectualism]. According to Llewellyn, "[olur present
intellectualism is on the road to annihilation and will reach its goal. This fact is rather
pleasant than otherwise." Id. at 1.
86 Id.
87 Id.
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to the decrease of private capital), and the social disfavor that
accompanied the accumulation of funds.88
However, Llewellyn felt the decline of intellectualism was "a
happy thing."89 He found living and helping others to live to be
two things in life which were worthwhile, while "intellectualism
tends away from both doing and sympathy."' Llewellyn castigated
the intellectual, who he described as a pompous, conceited wimp and
twit.9 ' Llewellyn's Code, therefore, was fact-based, hard-boiled and
did not rely on intellectual musings.92
IV. THE INFLUENCE OF CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL SCIENCE

Llewellyn saw the social sciences as spilling into the stagnant
canal of the law.93 In fact, he stated that the greatest influences
on his thought were social scientists, acknowledging his debt to
"Corbin, Cook, U. Moore, Oliphant, L. Frank, John Dewey, J.R.
Commons and the Boas School."94 Of these, Commons was an
economist; Dewey, a psychologist; Weber, a sociologist; and Boas, an
anthropologist. Moreover, Llewellyn practiced anthropology, writing
with anthropologist Adamson Hoebel about the legal customs of the
Cheyenne.95 Llewellyn professed that law was a "means to social

8'

Id.

at 2.

Id. at 3.
'o Id. Llewellyn divided thinking into "action directive" and "speculative or cultural." He
defined these terms as follows:
Action Directive thinking is an orderly projection of the imagination into the
future, with strict adherence to the facts of experience. It is checked up constantly,
and therefore useful. It makes action produce more results and more enjoyment for
self and others.
But speculative or cultural thinking is bad clear thru. It cannot be checked up.
There is no certainty about it. Each forward step in it is liable to geometrically
progressive error. Hence it arrives nowhere. Nor does it matter if it did: life under
one philosophy is essentially the same as that under another.
Id. at 7.
9 Id. at 8. Llewellyn pejoratively describes the effects of intellectualism. "Your physique
and mentality turn soft & gooy [sic] like a spotted apple." The intellectual becomes conceited,
"loses moral backbone.., his very existence depends on leisure," and is "oppressive." Id.
' See U.C.C. § 2-101 cmt. (1994) ("The purpose is to avoid making practical issues between
practical men turn upon the location of an intangible something, the passing of which no man
can prove by evidence and to substitute for such abstractions proof of words and actions of a
tangible character.").
9 Realism, supra note 2, at 1222.
Modern Mind, supra note 9, at 84 n.1 (1931). For a general description of the realisticmodernistic milieu in New York that influenced Llewellyn, who taught at Columbia, see ANN
89

DOUGLAS, TEnRRBLE HONESTY (1995).
95 See LLEWELLYN & HOEBEL, supra note 39.
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ends" needing "constantly to be examined for its purpose, and"96for its
effect" to see "how far it fits the society it purports to serve.
Unlike the present day neo-classical economists, the "between-thewars" social scientists used groups rather than individuals as their
unit of social analysis. Institutional economists, such as Veblen and
Commons, saw economics in terms of institutional, not individual
interaction. The individual-based economics of Adam Smith was
seen as appropriate only for the non-industrial age.9 7 The question
then became "how do groups work" which gave rise to the concept of
"working rules," the rules by which institutions actually function.
Llewellyn adopted this concept as the key to Legal Realism: a study
of how the law actually functioned. Llewellyn's Code, which takes
group practices and norms as its central principle, fits exactly within
this ideology.
The following chart describes three ways of looking at society.

Unit

Theory of
Political Economy

Era

The Nation State Progressivism

The Progressive Era

Groups

Collectivism

New Deal, Between-the-Wars

Individuals

Neo-classical economics, The Present
the "Rights" society

Realism, supra note 2, at 1236 (1931). Llewellyn also complained that social science
ignored the law:
I have also been restless at the curious blankness with which men from other social
disciplines face any legal matter or any talk of law. Of all the social disciplines it stands
most isolated. My own guess is that is because the law-men mainly think doctrine and
talk a language which runs in terms largely of correct doctrine-which is to exclude
communication and contact with any premises except the premises of correct doctrine.

But underneath all doctrines there lie problems, and those problems seem to me a proper
study for all men of the social disciplines, and an illuminating one. They extend through
all group-living, in any type of group. They are a meeting-ground on which exchange of
ideas and knowledge is possible between the men of law and the men of the social
disciplines.
Karl N. Llewellyn, The Normative, the Legal, and the Law-Jobs: The Problem of Juristic
Method, 49 YALE L.J. 1355, 1357 (1940).

9' See WHITE, supra note 62, at 187 (noting that "Adam Smith, ... according to Veblen,
formulated the Eighteenth-Century credo just as the Industrial Revolution was making it
obsolete").
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Note that the "between-the-wars" era focused on the groups within
a society, how they worked, and their rules.9" This group focus
contrasted with the Progressives who exalted state power over
groups and individuals. Finally, the individualistic era sought to
protect individuals' social, political, and economic rights from state
and group power.
Article Two of the UCC embodies
"institutionalism" by making the group behavior of merchants (trade
usage) its central normative and interpretative concept. 99
A.

Institutionalism

1. Working Groups as Institutions
To Llewellyn, "groups" were "working groups," not interest groups.
Groups are now defined by their social goals (environmentalists);
their social, ethnic, or sexual characteristics (African-Americans,
gays and lesbians); and even by their suffering from an affliction
(Adult Children of Alcoholics, AIDS sufferers). Llewellyn, along with
other "between-the-wars" thinkers, thought of groups more as those
working together on a common task: farmers, labor unionists, and
bankers. His thought paralleled the institutional economists, who
looked at the producing groups in the economy, and the
anthropologists, who studied tribes who were organized to get
through life's tasks.
Llewellyn saw the "working rules" as created by those inside the
working groups: those outside were the audience, passively consuming the products. The idea of consumer/community groups was
foreign to his thinking. The concept of the modern interest group
was not an important factor in "between-the-wars" thought. Veblen,
Commons, Boas, and Llewellyn were interested in groups of factory
workers, craftsmen, tribes, and merchants. All can be characterized
as groups working at something: either producing or, in the case of
the Cheyenne, surviving and living. The consumer group is a
product of our consumption-driven, individualistic society. It is hard
to reconceptualize the Code to include it.

"8 It is difficult to find a label which characterizes this mind-set. "Groupism" is unsightly
while "collectivism" conjures up visions of Soviet tractor factories. I have settled on
"institutionalism," a term that John Commons himself used to describe his own economics.

See JOHN R. COMMONS, INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: VEBLEN, COMMONS AND MITCHELL

RECONSIDERED (1963) (explaining the theory of institutionalism).
" See U.C.C. § 1-205 (1994).
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2. Rejection of Individualism
"Working rules"' ° was a term coined by the economist John
Commons.'"' His original use of the term came from his experience in the printing trade, where it was used to refer to the
rules that actually governed the work and the workers on the shop
floor.1

2

Commons gives the following definition of "working rules:"

Working rules are the way in which the management or
administration of collective action guides the acts of subordinate individuals. There is a hierarchy of collective action,
and history reveals how it came about. If economic science
had started with corporations and unions instead of individuals, it might have started with the rules of action
which apportion to each of the associated individuals the
kind and amount of work which each should do, the kind and
limits of transactions upon which each should enter, and the
shares of the joint product to be apportioned to each. These
apportionments
are made by the working rules of the
10 3
concern.

The day of the individual had passed; the Modern Age was the age
of men acting in groups. It was the age of the "masses:" mass
production, mass armies, mass demonstrations. In 1906, Pound
contrasted the individualistic spirit of the common law with the
group remedies of legislation 4 and argued that the common law
could not cope with the problems of modern civilization.'
According to Pound, the common law resisted the reforms of the legislation, using "common law guaranties of individual rights" that
"stand continually between the people, or large classes of the people,
and the legislation they desire."0

6

Pound articulated what seemed

'00 Llewellyn contrasted the "working rules" of an organization, the actual rules that the
organization followed, with the "paper rules," the rules that the organization purported to
follow but that existed only on paper. "'Paper rules' are what have been treated, traditionally,
as rules of law: the accepted doctrine of the time and place-what the books there say 'the law'
is." Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence- The Next Step, 30 HARv. L. REV. 431, 448
(1930).
101 COMMONS, supra note 66, at 27.
102

Id. at 26-27.

103

Id. at 125-26.

104 THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 337-53 (A. Leo

Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979).
105

1o

Id.
Id. at 344.
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to him to be an inversion of the "rights society"-it was the society
that needed protection from the individual. °7
In his review of John Commons' Legal Foundationsof Capitalism,
Llewellyn considered the economic concept of "marginalism" and
applied it to social and legal problems. The following excerpt
illustrates the difficulty in appreciating his arguments which have
implications that are so contrary to our society's individualistic,
"rights" oriented way of thinking:
Finally, when one attacks the effect of the law in shaping
conduct, in the profusion of cases where established morals
or habits of self-discipline seem to make law unnecessary,
one is led to hope that the marginal concepts may point the
road to understanding. The rules of law against assault come
into active play only at the individual margin when passion
crosses the threshold of self-control, and come into play
socially only with that marginal individual who falls below
the standard of self-control commonly developed by early
education. For it seems clear that, if the marginal individual
were not restrained at least in the bulk of cases, either in
self-defense or by imitation, laxity in the matter would
spread through the group; such is the process of cut-throat
competition.
So, too, with the enforcement of contract
obligation; and this regardless of delays, costs, and occasional
acquiescence in the breach of contracts.'
Llewellyn saw the individual as belonging at the margins, not as
a member of a minority group or as a non-conformist whose rights
deserve the protection of the law, but as a criminal. Thus, the
merchant who did not conform to group standards was viewed as a
cut-throat competitor, not as an entrepreneur. Llewellyn saw the
group-norms as the "good". Accordingly, the goal of both criminal
and contract law was to enforce these norms, not to protect the right
of the individual against their enforcement. The problem was
perceived to be "laxity," not conformism.
By the thirties, the common law and the prior age's emphasis on
individualism were seen as exemplifying cultural lag, where the
expressed ideals of the society lag behind a society's actual practices
and problems. The Left, however, appreciated that the Modem Age
belonged to the masses. Valentine Cunningham's description of the
British literary scene applied to America, as well:
Id. at 344.
'0 Effect, supra note 9, at 682.
'07
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Man had become Mass-man, Massenmensch, 'The Man' (to
use Edgar Allan Poe's title) 'Of the Crowd'. Inescapably, the
post-First-War sensibility had to grasp that it was in an age
of mass-production, mass-demonstrations, mass-meetings,
mass sporting occasions, mass-communications, mass-armies,
a time when things would be done, in, and to, and for
crowds.10 9

In an unpublished manuscript, Llewellyn rejected individualism,
and placed himself with the reforming Modernists:
If one had to select the major problem, outside of foreign
relations, for our nation of to-day [sic], I do not readily see
how one could avoid choosing the problem of how to reconcile
the ideology and practices of the older American individualism, and their values, with the needs of an economy
which has for a century been driving along into industrial
terms, corporate terms, national terms-but driving and
readjusting always primarily in terms primarily [sic] of
enterpriser'sinterest, modified chiefly by occasional political
revolts of larger voting classes who conceived themselves to
have been squeezed.11 °
The rejection of individualism is apparent in the UCC's adoption
of group norms as a principle of regulation and interpretation of
contract terms. Group norms regulate contracts by setting the
standard of "good faith;"" group practices define contract terms
through the introduction of usage of trade "to explain or supplement"
the terms of a contract;.. 2 and trade practices define the expected
quality of the goods." 3 Under the UCC, the individual merchant
is always subject to the norms and usages of his trade group."'

109 VALENTINE CUNNINGHAM, BRITISH WRITERS OF THE THIRTIES 266 (1988). The formalists,

however, including Wyndham Lewis, D.H. Lawrence, T.S. Eliot, and F.R. Leavis disliked the
masses; they "sustain[ed] a horrified rhetoric against mass-education, mass-production, massmeetings, mass-identity, mass-civilization." Id. at 277 (describing T. S.Eliot's reaction to the
collective). See F. R. LEAVIS, MASS CIVILIZATION AND MINORITY CULTURE (1930) (theorizing
that in an era of mass-culture, the minority of people that appreciated culture must work

harder to sustain it).
110 Karl N. Llewellyn, Careers 1 (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Albany Law
Review).
"'
112
11

U.C.C. § 2-103(b) (1994).
U.C.C. §§ 2-103(b), 1:-205(3) (1994).
U.C.C. § 2-314 (1994).

114 Id.
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3. The Necessity of Group Empowerment
New Deal thinkers sought to empower the groups within the
society to control their own destiny. Louis Jaffe, like Pound,
believed law's central problem was its ignorance of the groups
actually in society.'15 The law needed to deal with groups, controlling them through social engineering: "We require to study the
behavior of the subject-matter of control, men in groups; and to
invent such machinery as, with least waste, least cost, and least
unwanted by-product, will give most nearly the result desired."" 6
just lay out the field
Llewellyn believed the legal system should
1 7
operate.
could
units
smaller
within which
In The Cheyenne Way, Llewellyn focused on a "'contrast' between
primitive law and modern: that of 'group responsibility."' 8 He

stated that the individual does loom large in modern law. Yet, he
viewed the modern law as having "been moving uninterruptedly into

...See Louis L. Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201, 201 (1937)
("We are increasingly aware of the fact that the most significant and powerful components of
the social structure are economic groups, competing and complementary in varying degrees.
In the official political philosophies and in the explicit provisions of our constitutions, these
groups receive no recognition as political entities.").
16 Effect, supra note 9, at 666.
at 669 ("But the legal feature of this age remains, not the persistence among all men
117 Id.
of an interest in general security, but the emergence of diverse and specialized groups with
a need for specialized control."). Llewellyn was surprised at the diverse range of interests that
recognized this need:
It is curious to observe the most divergent groups in harmony on this point.
Corporate interests, cooperatives, soviets, guild socialists, and men in feudal
conditions, differ on whether to base the lesser unit on territory or other industrial
function, or capital contribution; on whether control should be according to birth,
ownership, membership, or service; on whether the rewards should be divided
according to military power, ownership, extent of member's use of the service, the
needs of the workers, or their day-to-day service contribution. They differ as to
whether the state or national supervising control should be apportioned by territory
or function, etc. But they all concur in the common platform that the central
supervising body should, outside of one central field common to all men as men and
to the particular system as a whole, do no more than lay out the field within which
each smaller unit operates and state the rules of interaction among units; and,
especially, that to the local or. industrial or other functional unit should be left
autonomous control of its own activity within those limits. The problem of achieving
adequate small-unit rule-making is therefore neither new nor American, but only
peculiarly acute in view of the character of the legal institutions which the present
generation in this country happen to have inherited. In Europe, for instance, the
existence of specialized commercial. courts lightens the burden materially.
Id. at 669 n.13.
"' LLEwELLYN & HOEBEL, supra note 39, at 50.
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expansion of group relations and of group responsibility: the party,
the corporation, the union, the cooperative, workmen's compensation,
and respondeat superior.""9 Llewellyn expressed this as follows:
"the dominant picture is coming more and more to stress groups,
other-than-kin groups, as the legal units."2 °
Under this theory, groups had to be empowered to police their
non-conforming members, whose deviant behavior would prevent the
arrival of order, efficiency, and productivity. Businessmen, through
the trade association movement, also sought to exert group control
on the non-conforming individual entrepreneur. The trade associations and cartels served as the primary private mechanisms to
do this, yet lacked the power to police individual members.' 2 ' As
such, non-conforming entrepreneurs could undercut the association's
established prices. Thus, the trend both among academics and
business people was to see society as a collection of groups, not of
individuals.' 2 Groups had to police the individuals and Llewellyn's empowerment of groups to determine "good faith" and "usages
of trade," as a part of Article 2's coverage of the sale of goods, was
part of this movement.
B. Anthropology and Realism
Of all fields of contemporary social thought, anthropology
dominated Llewellyn's thinking. A review of his writings from Effect
of Legal Institutions Upon Economics of 1925123 to the Common
Law Tradition of 1960124 reveals his anthropological approach,
using the tribe or the group as his unit of analysis. His Legal

119Id.

Id. at 51.
s' Note that although the Commerce Department, in the twenties, dispersed information
on competitors and promulgated codes of competition, "industry enjoyed to all intents and
purposes a moratorium from the Sherman Act." PAUL L. MURPHY, THE CONSTITUTION IN
CRISIS TIMES, 1918-1969 50 (1972) (quoting Charles A. Stevenson, Address (June 1934), in
MARSHAL E. DIMOCK, BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT: ISSUES IN PUBLIc POLICY 110 (1961)).
122 Valentine Cunningham made it clear
that this rejection of individualism was
120

international:

The Left was committed, more or less, to the communal idea as a good. As we've
seen, Socialists believed in plural pronouns, the social 'we', especially the Party 'we'
in solidarity with the working-classes. Leftist fiction is full of the Folk: of groups,
crowds, multitudes, of large throngs purposefully united in dances, singing, strikes,

demonstrations, marches, meetings ....
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 109, at 267.
122 Effect, supra note 9.
124 KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION (1960).
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Realism followed the approach of Franz Boas, who wrote: "To the
anthropologist, on the contrary, the individual appears important
only as a member of a racial or a social group....

The group, not

the individual, is always the primary concern of the
anthropologist."'25 Boas described the anthropological quest in
terms that could as well apply to Legal Realism:
W]e cannot treat the individual as an isolated unit. He
must be studied in his social setting, and the question is
relevant whether generalizations are possible by which a
functional relation between generalized social data and the
forms and expression of individual life can be discovered; in
other words, whether any generally valid laws exist that
govern the life of society.'26
1. Folkways, Folk Art, and Folk Music
Llewellyn emphasized anthropology in all his works.'27 Professor Danzig showed that the messages of sociology and anthropology
figure substantially in Llewellyn's thought. 28 William Graham
Sumner and Boas, the anthropologists cited by Llewellyn, focused on
the behavior of particular groups rather than on individual behavior
and styles of art. Their manner of investigating folkways and folk
art parallels the Realists' treatment of the law. Sumner's Folkways
described" social practices from around the world, such as
"slavery, 129 "sex mores, " 3 and "popular sports."' 3 '
Sumner

125

BOAS, supra note 83, at 12-13.

126

Id. at 15-16.

121

See, e.g., LLEWELLYN, supra note 124 (analyzing group behavior of appellate judges);

LLEWELLYN & HOEBEL, supra note 39 (describing the law of the Cheyenne Indians).
12 Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudenceof the Uniform Commercial Code, 27
STAN. L. REV. 621,622-27 (1975). Professor Danzig noted how Llewellyn's view of the lawyer's
role in society corresponded to the methods of anthropology:
For Llewellyn the flow of the attorney-client relationship is in the opposite direction.
Since the correct result is immanent in a situation, the client is better placed to

perceive it than the lawyer. The lawyer's function is to learn from the client: to
become informed about the situation, to cull the information he has gathered, to
organize it, and to translate it into terms that will inform the court. Note again how
analogous this position is to that of the anthropologist.
Id. at 626 n.16.
129

WILLIAM G. SUMNER, FOLKWAYS: A STUDY OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE OF

USAGES, MANNERS, CUSTOMS, MORES, AND MORALS 261-307 (1940).
130

Id. at 342-94.

Id. at 560-604. Not coincidentally, Llewellyn had studied under one of Sumner's
stv dents at Yale. Michael Ansaldi, The GermanLlewellyn, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 705, 757 n.199
(1992).
121
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described how "habit, routine and skill were developed" by early
man: "All at last adopted the same way for the same purpose; hence
the ways turned into customs and became mass phenomena.
Instincts were developed in connection with them. In this way
folkways arise. ""' Folkways that contain doctrines of truth and
right, including philosophical and ethical generalizations as to
societal welfare, are termed "mores".'
Laws arise from such
mores, and must be consistent with them to work effectively."'
However, there is conflict inherent in the relationship between laws
and mores. While laws are rational and practical, mores "cover the
great field of common life where there are no laws or police
regulations." 3 '
Franz Boas' investigation of tribal artifacts, such as his article on
Alaskan needle-cases,"' where page after page pictures and
analyzes needle-case after needle-case, can be seen as a model of
Legal Realist scholarship137 in which item after item is studied
and compared. Just as anthropologists do not treat artistic style
mechanically, but rather, as a set of principles, Legal Realists
viewed laws simply as general principles governing behavior and not
a set of formal rules.
C. Anthropology and Commercial Law
The Legal Realists were fascinated by anthropology and sought to
apply its teachings to the study of law. They based this application
on the highly questionable assumption that modern western society
works in the same way traditional societies do. To Llewellyn, the
tribes studied by Sumner and Boas became groups of merchants and
judges, and styles, folkways, and mores became usages of trade and
ways of judging.
Legal Realism can be characterized as an anthropological
approach to the law. The Realists studied the law objectively, in the
132 SUMNER, supra note 129, at 2.
133Id. at 36-38.
134 See Karl N. Llewellyn, What Law Cannot Do ForInter-RacialPeace, 3 VILL. L. REV. 30

(1957) (explaining the problems with racial integration in the 1950s) [hereinafter Racial

Peace]. See also James E. Herget & Stephen Wallace, The GermanFree Law Movement As the
Source of American Legal Realism, 73 VA. L. REV. 399, 404-405 (1987) (explaining that law
arose from folkways).
135 SUMNER, supra note 129, at 56.
'36 FRANZ BOAS, RACE LANGUAGE AND CULTURE 564-92 (1940).
137 Cf. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SALES (1930) (summarizing sales
case after sales case-801 in all).
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same manner an anthropologist would view the practices of a tribe.
Thus, the study of law is a study of what "judges do" rather than
what the law should be. Llewellyn repeatedly and explicitly adopted
an "anthropological" approach. For example, in his work explaining
the common law method to Germans, Llewellyn collected American
138
legal cases just as Boas had selected his Eskimo needle-cases.
The Legal Realists adopted techniques used to study autonomous,
non-industrial, non-Western societies in order to study groups within
Western industrial society, such as coal miners, sellers of goods, and
judges. Both had "folkways," "styles," and "language" characteristic
of and determined by the group's traditions. Tribes became groups
of merchants and judges, folk art styles became styles of judges (the
"Grand" and "the Formal"), and folkways became trade usages."3 9
Llewellyn felt that current trades were equivalent to the local
cultures of yesteryear. To him, groups of merchants (and lawyers
and judges) followed a cohesive body of folkways, traditions, and
practices that can be determined by anthropological technique. 4 °
In the old days men's cultures-I use the term here in its
broadest sense: the whole body of men's attitudes and ways
and thoughts-in the old days these cultures grew apart
locally, grew into regional character, valley to valley, city to
city, land to land. Occupations, means of livelihood, were
reasonably alike for all. Rye in Germany, wheat in England,
corn in our South, but agriculture everywhere. Around this
central unity the cultures varied, under the dim-seen

...
After "collecting" these cases, Llewellyn discussed them and described his analytical
technique. He noted the need for lawyers, like anthropologists to use "modern anthropological
techniques:"
Anthropologists have long been prey to the easy and regrettable misconception that
things happen in a society the way the natives claim they happen. Lately,
anthropologists have indeed been describing this prevailing native ideology but have
at the same time compared it with the way things are actually observed to happen
(which in general may be more or less at variance with the way the natives say they
happen). ... It is time that lawyers, both in their own law and above all in
comparative legal studies, learned this skepticism of anthropologists. The existence
of a statutory provision, or of a generally acknowledged rule, is certainly interesting,
but in and of itself really says nothing.
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAw SYSTEM IN AMERICA 47 n.2 (Paul Gerwitz ed. & Michael
Ansaldi trans., 1989) (1933).
'" See generally KALMAN, supra note 67, at 1-44 (describing the characteristics of Legal
Realism).
140 See Chris Williams, The Search for Bases of Decision in Commercial Law: Llewellyn
Redux, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1495, 1507 (1984) (reviewing LEON E. TRAKMAN, THE LAW
MERCHANT: THE EVOLUTION OF COMMERCIAL LAw (1983)).
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influence of language, faith, a focussing on cotton or on corn;
on flax, the vine or the olive; under that other much
neglected influence, the ways of food. The difference between
johnny cake and pie, black bread and muffins, cuts vastly
deeper than most have imagined. Travel was then the
broadening, the stirring influence-travel from one narrow
close knit culture to the next. And men learned to think that
stimulating cultural differences displayed themselves in little
surface ways; learned to look to such differences in surface
ways as the only index to cultural stimulus. When one who
has learned to think thus looks about him in America, he
must despair. Americans at the ball games or the poles are
alarmingly alike. In the smoking car, at bridge, or in the
street-alarmingly alike. These are the surface ways,
spreading their likeness throughout our Western civilization
more and more.
But the cultures of today grow apart less by places
than by occupations. As voters or as theater goers we
are one tribe, alike. As bricklayers, plumbers, coal
miners, corn belt farmers, hardware men, we are as
different as are Czechs and Spaniards. 4 '
There were policy reasons to try to locate and enforce the practices
of merchants. Sumner adopted a Darwinistic view which saw good
folkways as surviving over lesser ones in a long unconscious
process. 42 The Realists also felt that one could locate true value

14

Karl N. Llewellyn, This Cut-Rate American Culture 7-8 (unpublished manuscript, on file

with the Albany Law Review). One can doubt the equation of the tribe and the trade.
Professor Chris Williams has criticized Llewellyn's idealistic assumption "that merchants are
in general agreement about trade practices and that decision makers are capable of

recognizing those areas of agreement and employing them as bases of decision in disputed
cases." Williams, supra note 140, at 1507. Professor Williams argued that when a buyer and
seller go to court, one can infer that the trade custom was too vague to resolve the dispute.
Id. at 1508. To Williams, Llewellyn did not offer "any convincing empirical evidence" that

agreement on "reasonable commercial behavior" exists. Id. Professor Williams denied
Llewellyn's central premise: that the usages of particular trades should control commercial
law. Id.
12 In discussing folkways, Sumner stated:
They are like products of natural forces which men unconsciously set in operation,
or they are like the instinctive ways of animals, which are developed out of
experience, which reach a final form of maximum adaptation to an interest, which

are handed down by tradition and admit of no exception or variation, yet change to
meet new conditions, still within the same limited methods, and without rational
reflection or purpose.
SUMNER, supra note 129, at 4.
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and authenticity in traditional group practices. As stated by
Llewellyn, "when I listen to my friend discuss tar paving I sit in the
presence of a devotee, I hear the ritual of a faith, I bow before the
art and glory of a craftsman."" Llewellyn turned to group crafts
to escape what today we would call "pop" culture.'
Such disdain for popular, mass-culture was pervasive. Valentine
Cunningham points out that thinkers from the Marxists to T.S. Eliot
condemned pop culture, with its vulgarity, jazz, and "sex-appeal." 45 Realism was seen as being in competition with popular
soap-operas."' Thus, folk art based on tradition, such as the folk
song, had value and authenticity."' Like the folk songs, merchant
practices have evolved.
There is an anthropological connection between the merchant
rules and aesthetics. Llewellyn saw merchants as forming discrete
groups, each with its own customs and practices. Such a group,
produced its own artifacts, which time would evolve into something
functional and beautiful." There is a parallel between merchant
practices and the Alaskan needle-cases studied by Boas."' They
are functional (they hold needles) and beautiful.
They are
traditional: they can only be understood as the products of a
tribe.' 5°
As the native Alaskans created beautiful objects of folk art,
merchants have created beautiful and functional mercantile
practices, such as the C.I.F. contract used in international marine

...Llewellyn, supra note 141, at 8.
'"
In discussing the then-present state of affairs of American culture, Llewellyn wrote,
look a minute at this tawdry spreading culture-the sentimental drool or he-man
stuff that sells as fiction; the leaded testimony at the murder trial; the intimate
venomous details of an off-color sex dispute; the blat of poorer jazz; the riot of cliche
of thought and phrase; the empty prettiness of poster girls.
Id. at 2.
141 See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 109, at 284 (noting the formalists'
disapproval of society's
"addiction" to popular culture).
146 See id.
"7 Karl N. Llewellyn, Folksong 1-2 (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Albany Law
Review). Llewellyn wrote: "[tihe essence of a folk song: that it shall, over some period, have
been sung, and have been transmitted by tradition.... Folk song that seems most lasting,
sweet to recur, has simplicity, depth, straightness, and deals with vital emotions." Id. For
a discussion of the thirties' interest in folk-music, see CHARLEs WOLFE & KIP LORNELL, THE
LwE AND LEGEND OF LEADBELLY (1992).
"'s See Llewellyn, supra note 141, at 8 (rhapsodizing on the art of skilled labor).
149 See BOAS, supra note 136.
150 See BOAS, supra note 83, at 211 (discussing how a society's mores affect the inventions
that it produces).
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shipping."' The merchant rules, then, are similar to the law codes
Llewellyn proposed for the Native Americans;1 5 e they are
functional and beautiful rules proposed for a discrete group.
Specialized groups need specialized rules; rather than create rules
of general application, rules should be tailored to the particular
characteristics and needs of the group. So the folk song, the C.I.F.
contract, and the Grand Style of the Common Law Tradition, are all
practices that have stood the test of time and have evolved in good
and beautiful ways. Group practices are good and should be
practiced and enforced against dissidents. 5 '
Judges can be seen as tribes practicing folk art. 5 For example,
in shaping the law of the letter of credit, the commercial law judges,
as a group, evolved the applicable law "[n]ot in isolated instances,
but repeatedly, they showed a group wisdom often exceeding that of
the business community whose institutions they were called on to
sanction or reject."' 55 The judge's work displays a "style" typical
of the group.'5 6 Llewellyn explicitly discusses the problems of the
use of "style" to analyze legal behavior. "Style," as a tool of analysis,
works best for tangible monuments, music, literature, and architecture, but also works for appellate judging, the drafting of documents,

' Karl N. Llewellyn, On the Good, The True, The Beautiful, In Law, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 224,
228-29 (1942) [hereinafter Good].
152 See LLEWELLYN & HOEBEL, supra note 39.

As written by Llewellyn in 1928:
I propose to ring changes, perhaps ad nauseam, on three simple facts: first, that
law observance is a question not of legal rules, but of the formation of folkways that
can be and will be learned chiefly without direct reference to particular rules;
second, that law and folkways alike are not general and common to our society, but
are different and specific according to groups, occupational and other; and third, that
for mass, as contrasted with individual, attempts at control, the problem of
lawmaking and of law enforcement centers on informed, sustained effort to find the
particular persons whose conduct is concerned, and to devise means for affecting the
conduct patterns of those particular persons.
Karl N. Llewellyn, Law Observance Versus Law Enforcement, reprinted in KARL N.
LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 399, 399 (1928).
1"4 Llewellyn treated appellate judges as a corporate body: "Moreover, the study is directed
at courts and not at individuals, and the 'average' appellate judge displays himself better in
the blurred but real corporate person of the court and in the corporate behavior than he can
by any analysis of individuals and averaging of their attributes." KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE
COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 515-16 (1960).
155 Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Advantages of Letters of Credit, 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2 (1929).
"' Llewellyn contends that "[i]nside craft-work, style does tend to unify. . . . What our
opinions do show is a drive to fit the style of reason in judging into a type of opinion which is
appropriate, and which has structure, form, and life." LLEWELLYN, supra note 154, at 468.
'6
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and the
writing of briefs, which leave monuments in their own
157
right.

Llewellyn valued trade practices (including the trade practices of
law) as embodying a spirit of craftsmanship. 15 His concept that
man has an innate drive towards craftsmanship and quality comes
from another thinker, Thorstein Veblen, who conceived of an
"instinct of workmanship" that was "chief among those instinctive
dispositions that conduce directly to the material well-being of the
race."'59 Veblen considered workmanship and parenting as man's
two primal instincts. 6 ° To him, instincts were neither blind nor
unaffected by thought.16 ' Veblen concluded that "all instinctive
action is teleological ...

involves holding to a purpose . . . aims to

achieve some end and involves some degree of intelligent faculty to
compass the instinctively given purpose."'62 The characteristics of
Veblen's "instinct of workmanship" can be used to characterize the
UCC and the jurisprudence of Realism as it "occupies the interest
with practical expedients, ways and means, devices and contrivances

157

Professor Hillinger points out that Llewellyn was creating an archeological object-a set

of principles that could be used by businessmen as the Native Americans used their traditional
design principles:
Llewellyn planned to create beautiful law for businessmen. Such law would be
beautiful because it was functional. For Llewellyn, legal esthetics were in essence
functional esthetics. Article 2 would create law businessmen could use, law which would
guide them in their affairs: 'A structure of legal rules, howsoever fair of face, must
function well or be an active Evil to the men and work it houses.' Legal rules could be
functional only if they were clear, certain and predictable. Predictability, in turn, would
be insured only if the rules protected good faith and did not require misconstruction to
produce good results. In drafting Article 2, Llewellyn sought to create 'a body of sales
law which is clear, guidesome, which it is almost impossible to misconstrue.' Llewellyn
wanted his rules to protect good faith and provide predictable and satisfactory results,
both in court and out. That aim, determined by Llewellyn's theory of what legal rules
should accomplish, explains why he stated separate merchant rules in Article 2.
Hillinger, supra note 53, at 1163 (citations omitted).
'5s Llewellyn, supra note 141. Llewellyn wrote:
When I listen to my friend discuss tar paving and sit in the presence of a devotee,
I hear the ritual of a faith, I bow before the act and glory of a craftsman. All new
to me, all fresh, all stirring.... But man remains man... it is a strange human
animal that can sell rustless screens, aluminum ware, or champion bed springs long
without enthusiasm for flylessness or looking at the sleep that passeth understanding.
Id. at 8-9.
'59 THE PORTABLE VEBLEN 312-13 (Max Lerner ed., 1948) [hereinafter VEBLEN].
160 Id.
'' Id. at 312.
162Id. at 318.
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of efficiency and economy, proficiency, creative work and technological mastery of facts."163
Using contemporary social and economic thought, it is possible to
understand why usage of trade is the controlling concept of the Sales
Article. Society was seen as a composite of organized groups, each
different, each operating under its own set of folkways and working
rules. Thus, law had to be particularized and customized on the
group level. Businessmen, as well as social scientists, sought group
control of individual business through mechanisms, such as the
trade association, and legislation, such as the National Industrial
Recovery Act. Social scientists, businessmen, and legal scholars all
sought to empower groups to control their marginal members. In
fact, such control of the marginal member, the "chiseler," was seen
as the key to regaining prosperity.'6 4
Anthropologists, ethnologists, and institutional economists, viewed
group practices as good. Group practices were viewed by them as
products of an evolutionary process that produced such artifacts as
Native American art, the C.I.F. contract, and the folk song.161
Trade practices had evolved in a non-intellectual, natural way to be
functional and to meet the group's needs. The UCC's use of "usage
of trade" and "standards of fair dealing in the trade" sought to
achieve the virtues of the "folkway" in commercial law."
D. Between-the-Wars Economics
1. Institutional Economics
In economics, it was the institutional economists Veblen and
Commons who influenced Llewellyn the most.'6 7 The institutional
economist school of thought focused on the collective, not the
individual. 6 8 The institutional economists also shared a view of

Id. at 320.
For a discussion of the "chiseler," see infra text accompanying note 170.
161 This explains why museums of natural history consist of exhibits about dinosaurs and
tribal life. Both are seen as products of the natural process of evolution, rather than artifice.
166 See U.C.C. §§ 1-205, 2-103(1)(b) (1994).
167 Hovenkamp, supra note 65, at 1014.
168 COMMONS, supra note 98, at 902. In the words of Commons:
This is the problem of modern economics, which is coming to be known as
Institutional Economics. An institution is merely collective action in control,
liberation, and expansion of individual action. It may be Communism, Fascism, or
Capitalism. The economic philosophy of the French Revolution would have abolished
163
'
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the history of law and economics, a skepticism of laissez-faire, and
a preference for government coordination that fit with their
collectivist views.'69
Additionally, the institutional economists
subscribed to an economic paradigm that explained the causes and
prescribed a cure for the Depression, that I term "pre-Keynesian
macro-economics." In the thirties, before Keynesianism triumphed,
the cause of the Depression was seen to be the "chiseler." This term
referred to the seller who was producing shoddy goods at low prices
and paying his workers less and less, thus sending commerce into an
ever-descending spiral. 7 ° To cure this problem, several statutes
were proposed or enacted, including the NRA, the NLRA, the AAA,
and the UCC.
Llewellyn credited Veblen and Commons as being the two major
intellectual influences on his work.' 7 ' In fact, Veblen and Commons appear to be the only economists Llewellyn credits. For
Veblen and Commons, the history and dynamics of groups, and not
the assumed principles of individual wealth maximization comprise
the foundation of economics."' Like Karl Llewellyn, they believed
that each economic
group had its own rules and had to be studied on
73
its own terms.

To Commons, the transactionwas the fundamental unit of society.
The transaction, however, did not take place in a vacuum between
two wealth-maximizing individuals. Rather, it developed under the
working rules of the group. Commons wrote:
Collective action proceeds, indeed, not from the intellectual
logic of philosophers and economists, but from the arguments,
debates, conferences, compromises, mass meetings,
agreements,
disagreements, negotiations, propaganda-among ordinary people themselves, like business men,
laboring men, farmers, or professional classes, when forced or
persuaded to consider their common interests.
The
psychology of this give-and-take process of conciliation and
agreement may be named negotiational psychology, to

collective action. The economic philosophy now, the world over, is the philosophy of

collective action.

Id.
'"

See generally id. (discussing the prevalent economic philosophy).

"'o LOUIS GALAMBOS, COMPETITION AND COOPERATION: THE REEMERGENCE OF A NATIONAL

TRADE ASSOCIATION 198 (1966).
.71See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
'7'See infra notes 207-212 and accompanying text.
171 See note 168 and accompanying text.
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distinguish it from the pleasure-pain psychology of the
individualistic economists since the eighteenth century.'74
Institutionalism concerned itself with "collective action." The
individual was viewed, not as an independent entity, but as part of
a working group. This view contrasted with that of the classical
economists who saw society as a chance collection of individuals.
Commons used Bentham's sovereign as one example of this contrast:
Bentham's "sovereign," also, was not an outcome of the
customs or other collective action of the mass of individuals
who constituted his "community." His individuals were a
population, not a society; they were "chance" individuals, not
a going concern; and his sovereign was an outsider, not a
part of the society.175
Collective action, however, was also liberating and empowering:
Collective Action is more than control of individual
action-it is, by the very act of control, as indicated by the
auxiliary verbs, a liberation of individual action from
coercion, duress, discrimination, or unfair competition, by
means of restraints placed on other individuals.
And Collective Action is more than restraint and liberation
of individual action-it is expansion of the will of the
individual far beyond what he can do by his own puny
acts. 176
Thus, the two fundamental concepts of Commons' institutionalism
are collective action and the transaction. 77 These are also the
fundamental concepts of Article 2. The sales transaction has to be
seen in the context of the particular trade, in measuring good faith,
determining the meaning of contract language, and evaluating the
quality of goods.'

174 COMMONS, supra note 66, at 28-29 (1970). For a discussion of Commons and the use of
his collectivism in modern Denmark, see Yngve Ramstad, Reasonable Value and Denmark's
Negotiated Economy, 25 J. OF ECON. IssuES 431 (1991). The anthropologist Boas, another of
the influences on Llewellyn, is considered by some to be an institutional economist. Joseph
Dorfman, The Background of InstitutionalEconomics, in INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: VEBLEN,

COMMONS, AND MITCHELL RECONSIDERED 1, 19 (1964) ("Franz Boas offered an approach that
was closely related to institutionalism, if indeed it might not be characterized as
institutionalist anthropology.").
175COMMONS, supra note 98, at 234.
176Id. at 73.

177Neil W. Chamberlain, Institutional Economics of Commons, in INSTITUTIONAL
ECONOMICS: VEBLEN, COMMONS, AND MITCHELL RECONSIDERED 63, 74-75 (1964).
176 See U.C.C. § 1-205 (1994).
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2. Economic History
Institutional economists and other social thinkers such as
Arnold,' 7 9 Commons, 8 0
Frank,'8 ' Hamilton,8 2
Isaacs,"8 3
4
Llewellyn,' * and Veblen'
shared a view of economic history
and of the developmental changes in commerce, technology, and
economic organization. This theory of history fits the era's modernistic program in explaining the differences between the prior age
and the present one and why the prior era's economic theories and
law had to be rejected.8 6 The first stage was pre-industrial,
characterized by artisan producers who. sold directly to the
buyer.8 7 Isaacs' description of the old Sales Act is typical. He
saw it as approximately
dating the business picture back two or three generations
ago, and in emphasizing the type of sale as one by the dealer
who is likely to be the maker, to a lay consumer. The picture
is satisfied by the horseman
who stops at the saddler's door
88
to buy a new saddle.
Adam Smith's laissez-faire was appropriate only to that prior era.
The Industrial Revolution had made Smith obsolete. However, this
revolution, which was characterized by individual production led to
the problems of cut-throat competition, over production, and cyclical
economic fluctuations.8 9
Government institutions, trade associations, and unions grew since more collective control was needed
to solve the problems created by industrial production."
See
See
...See
182 See
183 See
179

180

ARNOLD, supra note 30, at 2.
COMMONS, supra note 98, at 1-9.
FRANK, supra note 30, at 3.
HAMILTON & WRIGHT, supra note 24, at 54.
Nathan Isaacs, The IndustrialPurchaserand the Sales Act, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 263

(1934).
184 See Effect, supra note 9, at 668.
185 See VEBLEN,supra note 159, at 54.
188 Compare this historical approach with that of neo-classical economics: since man always
has been a wealth maximizer, the same economic theory can analyze the problems of 1776 and

today.

Isaacs, supra note 183, at 263.
Id.
.8.See generally FRANK FREIDEL, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: A RENDEZVOUS WITH DESTINY
85-86 (1990) (discussing FDR's belief that the key to economic recovery was to get individual
producers, like farmers, to decrease production which would increase prices and thereby
stabilize the economy and stimulate industrial recovery).
190 See, e.g., HAMILTON & WRIGHT, supra note 24, at 3-6. Hamilton and Wright examined
the coal industry which was initially a petty industry, characterized by free entry of individual
187
188
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Llewellyn examined the evolution from a mercantile economy to
an industrial economy, and finally to financial capitalism.'9 ' He
recognized that laws needed to reflect the modem markets and not
the older face-to-face markets. 92 One change that Llewellyn
believed was necessary to modernize the law of sales was an
expanded warranty of quality."3 Although a warranty of quality
was unnecessary when goods were exchanged face-to-face and when
buyers knew their sellers, such a warranty was needed when goods
were mass-produced and distributed over long distances.'
Therefore, the law of caveat emptor became a relic. 95
Like caveat emptor, individual contracting was also considered
obsolete.'" Moreover, many scholars were growing skeptical of
laissez-faire economics. 9 v Instead of individual self-determination,
institutions and groups became important in the contracting
process. 98
One can view the UCC as embodying the collectivist mentality of
the institutionalists. The UCC's "standardized contract" applies to
an agreement unless the parties contract out of it."9 For example,
the warranty of merchantability applies unless the parties exclude
it from the contract.2 °° Furthermore, the language of the contract
will be interpreted based on the parties' group membership.2 ' In

miners. Id. These miners could set their own terms of employment and bargain individually
with the buyers. Id. However, after the industrial revolution, larger enterprises engaged in
mass-production took over. Id.
191 See Horseback, supra note 52, at 726.
12 See Unhorse Sales, supra note 37, at 883 (viewing the legal history of his subject as a
.struggle to unhorse Sales law, and to make conscious a proper merchants' law of wares
moving to and through a merchants' market"); see also id. at 903 (raising doubts as to the
proliferation of protective devices such as warehouse receipts and bill of lading acts).
193 On Warranty I, supra note 45, at 712.
194 Id.
191 Id. at 713 (explaining the idea of holding sellers accountable through various obligations
based on good faith and contract law).
196 Nathan Isaacs, The Standardizingof Contracts, 27 YALE L.J. 34, 46-47
(1917).
197 Id. at 47.
198 Id. at 45 (analogizing the movement away from individual contracts to medieval
status
since an individual's rights and duties depended more on his economic status or institutional
affiliation than on individual bargains).
199 U.C.C. §§ 2-201 to 2-210, 2-301 to 2-328
(1994).
2o

Id. at § 2-314.

"' Id. at § 1-205(3) (providing that "[a] course of dealing between parties and any usage of
trade in the vocation or trade in which they are engaged or of which they are or should be
aware give particular meaning to and supplement or qualify terms of an agreement").
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any event, the parties are bound by good faith, which is defined as
the practices of honest and fair merchants." 2
3. Between-the-Wars Macro-Economics
The economists in the interwar years occupied a peculiar position
because they had rejected Adam Smith but had not yet discovered
Keynes. °3 The concept of the multiplier, that government spending multiplies throughout the economy creating demand, was not
widely accepted when proposed in 1933.204 It was not until 1938
that FDR
accepted Keynesian theory and adopted a spending
20 5
policy.
If the cause of the Great Depression was not a maladjustment of
the price-allocation system or a mistaken fiscal policy, what was it?
Today, many scholars see the debate as being between the neoclassicists and the Keynesians. However, these scholars have overlooked that there was another view, which can be termed "PreKeynesian Macro-Economics,"
which most intellectuals,
businessmen, and even President Roosevelt accepted.
a. Prevention of Chiseling
The pre-Keynesian macro-economists believed that business was
caught in a vicious cycle. They thought that overproduction led to
lower prices and "chiseling," the lessening of the quality of goods and
cheating, which further caused lower wages, decreased demand,
overproduction, and, finally, lower prices and chiseling again.20 6

22

Id. at § 2-103(1)(b).

203

See HERBERT STEIN, THE FISCAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICA 149, 474 n.28 (1990)

(explaining that before 1936, economists were not influenced by Keynesian theories and

policies since Keynes did not develop his theories until later during the New Deal).
4 See id. at 153 (indicating that Keynes proposed the idea of multipliers in 1933 to
increase government spending which would increase total spending and incomes by a multiple
thereof); see also id. at 50 (indicating that FDR disregarded the effects of government spending
on the economy since he thought that there were only a few areas where the government could
usefully spend money).
20' FREIDEL, supra note 189, at 255.
"0 See GALAMBOS, supra note 170, at 198. FDR described the chiseler problem in one of
his fireside chats. He advocated an "'orderly industrial system' in which the majority within
an industry would, with government backing, bring 'minorities to understand that their unfair
practices [were] contrary to the sound public policy of the nation.'" Id. (quoting Minutes of
Twenty-First Annual Meeting of U.S. Chamber of Commerce (May 4, 1933)). FDR explained
why industry and government should work together:
Take the cotton goods industry. It is probably true that ninety per cent of the cotton
manufacturers would agree to eliminate starvation wages, would agree to stop long

HeinOnline -- 59 Alb. L. Rev. 365 1995-1996

Albany Law Review

[Vol. 59

This process was further characterized by chaotic fluctuations in
production, poor quality goods, ruinous cut-throat competition, °7
and wages too low to allow workers and their families to maintain
minimum standards of health and welfare.2 8
President Roosevelt hoped that the National Industrial Recovery
Act (NIRA) would redistribute income and thereby assure greater
buying power."' The NIRA created the National Recovery Administration (NRA) which, along with business, was responsible for
enacting fair competition codes.21° These codes, which were
drafted by business and which were supposed to be exempt from
Antitrust laws, set wages, hours and working conditions.211 FDR
intended for these fair practice standards to create higher prices and
restore profits, in return for which businesses would accept wage

hours of employment, would agree to stop child labor, would agree to prevent an
overproduction that would result in unsalable surpluses. But, what good is such an
agreement if the other ten per cent of cotton manufacturers pay starvation wages,
require long hours, employ children in their mills and turn out burdensome
surpluses? The unfair ten per cent could produce goods so cheaply that the fair
ninety would be compelled to meet the unfair conditions. Here is where government
comes in. Government ought to have the right and will have the right, after
surveying and planning for an industry to prevent, with the assistance of the
overwhelming majority of that industry, unfair practice and to enforce this
agreement by the authority of government.
Id. (quoting Franklin D. Roosevelt, Remarks at President's Fireside Chat (May 7, 1933)). This
meant that the policing of quality and fair practices was necessary for prosperity. See infra
notes 267-69 and accompanying text. The President's description resembles Llewellyn's
explanation of the "marginal businessman" who caused the problems. See Effect, supra note
*9, at 682 (pointing out that legal rules were necessary to contain "marginal individuals" and
prevent the proliferation of lax morals and cut-throat competition).
217 Cut throat competition is exemplified by the board game Monopoly, which was a product
of that era. The point of Monopoly is that if one player obtains all the resources and
eliminates all other players from the game, he destroys competition. Similar to the gameplayer, a business or individual who, through superior bargaining power, could continually
negotiate better deals, would eventually eliminate other trading partners, and ruin the entire
system.
208 See FRANK, supra note 30, at 235. Frank indicated that "the total national income is
bound to shrink alarmingly unless a large enough number of citizens receive some fair share
of it. The fate of those Americans who receive relatively high incomes is therefore inextricably
bound up with that of those who receive low incomes. The former cannot prosper unless the
latter do." Id.
209 See FREIDEL, supra note 189, at 126-27. Roosevelt spoke of the "deeper purposes of the
NRA in building up wages that were at the starvation level and in slashing hours that were
too long, resulting in 'a greater distribution of income and wages' and consequently an increase
in employment and in 'the purchasing power of the average American citizen and, therefore,
of the Nation as a whole.'" Id. (footnotes omitted).
210 STEPHEN R. PRESSER & JAMIL S. ZANALDIN, LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE
IN AMERICAN
HISTORY: CASES AND MATERIALS 737 (2d ed. 1980).
211

Id.
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and hour guarantees. 12 FDR hoped this increased demand would
then prompt businesses to invest in new enterprises.213
Like the NRA, the first drafts of the UCC sought to combat
chiseling.
The standard of mercantile performance and the
mercantile jury that would determine that standard were intended
to work together to prevent chiseling on both sides.214 Moreover,
Llewellyn proposed that there should be a "survey to determine the
condition of the goods" 15 in order to prevent chiseling.2 ' The
UCC's enforcement of group norms by employment of trade usage,
good faith, and quality standards had the macro-economic purpose
of preventing chiseling and thereby restoring prosperity.

FREIDEL, supra note 189, at 127.
id.
214 See R.U.S.A, supra note 40, § 11-A cmt. 2, at 383-84. The comment to section 11-A of
212

213

the 1941 draft indicates:
(2) The question of fact about substantialdefect. Despite recognized understanding of the commercial obligation in mercantile sales as extending only to mercantile
performance, as between decent merchants, there remains the fear of chiseling by
the indecent seller, if "the bars are let down." This is a legitimate fear. The price
of indulging it, is of course to leave the bars down for the indecent buyer; but one
evil should not be incurred to cure another of like kind and extent. And a court is
rarely, and a jury almost never, equipped to pass with sound mercantile judgment
on such a question as substantiality of a defect in performance in a particular trade.
By the same token, neither a court nor a jury is equipped in the ordinary course
to pass upon a question of compliance with description in, say, the textile field, or
upon those questions of "usage of trade" whose incidence runs throughout the Draft,
as it did throughout the Original Act.
Thus the machinery provided in Section 59 for quick determination of mercantile
questions of fact, by experts largely chosen by the parties, puts the whole of Sales
law upon a new foundation of reckonability and certainty which it has lacked-save
in the hands of a few great commercial judges-since the time of Mansfield's famous
jury.
As applied to the question of fact in mercantile performance questions in
particular, Section 59 would seem to remove danger of either uncertainty or of
successful chiseling, and make it possible to assure to both decent buyers and decent
sellers proper protection by law of their mercantile expectations.
Id.
215Id. § 56(3)(a) at 509.
216 See id. § 56 cmt. 2, at 511-12. This comment indicates that such a survey
seeks also to guard against chiseling under a lien by use of such lien (buyer's or
seller's) to withhold the goods from examination by the other party. The essential
sanction of the last sentence lies in the probable effect on a trier of fact of seeing
evidence of the demand for inspection and of the refusal. There is no reasonable
possibility of such evidence being cooked in bad faith, since the party in possession
can prevent that by offering a joint inspection or a survey.
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b. Achieving Equal BargainingPower
Another goal of the reformers was to achieve equal bargaining
power. The reformists were skeptical of the free market.217 They
doubted the free market's freedom and thought that the chiseler
would, in the absence of regulation, depress, demoralize, and
disorganize the markets by driving down wages and purchasing
power."' However, these reformists, who believed that the true
value of a commodity was determined in transactions between
equals,219 felt that transactions among equals, with standards
being strictly policed, would break the vicious cycle of lower prices,
wages, and consumption.22 ° Many thought that sales was a field
in which such equality could be achieved since merchants were both
buyers and sellers.22 ' Representative trade associations and the

217

See OTs L. GRAHAM, JR., AN ENCORE FOR REFORM: THE OLD PROGRESSIVES AND THE

NEW DEAL 6 (1967) (explaining that Progressives and New Dealers viewed unrestricted
economic power as the enemy).
218 See supra notes 206-208 and accompanying text.
219 COMMONS, supra note 98, at 344.
0 See id. at 345. Reasonableness of bargaining power is crucial as it is the only fair way
to share limited resources and works against "cut throat" competition:
Extended to the business community, under such names as business ethics, it is the
purpose, by means of this newly permitted bargaining power, to prevent that
individual bargaining of competitors which steals customers by cutting prices, or
steals labor by raising wages. It is now coming to be believed-a belief not
contemplated by the early economists-that both the purchasing power of the public
and the supply of labor-power are limited. Therefore, the new ethical doctrine of
"live-and-let-live" indicates that the proper procedure-instead of the practice of
competing by individual bargainers in order to pull customers or laborers away from
competitors by lower prices or higher wages-is to get only a reasonable share of
that limited purchasing power or limited labor-power.
Id.
Commons saw the concern with "reasonable bargaining power" as supplanting the concerns
of classical economics:
Hence the practical theories of today, in the United States, are not the older theories
of individual competition, individual property, the liberty of individual bargaining,
the mechanism of free competition, nor even the communist theories of prohibition
of bargaining. They are the theories of reasonable bargaining power. These come
before economists and courts under the four groupings of discrimination, or unequal
opportunity for individual bargaining; fair competition instead of free competition;
reasonable price instead of normal or natural competitive price; and equal or
unequal treatment of the different kinds of bargaining power, such as that of
laborers and employers, farmers and capitalists, etc.
Id.
221 See Effect, supra note 9, at 674 (discussing the promise of a system of collective
bargaining to resolve disputes and create equality).
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type of bargaining used by the NRA to promulgate trade standards
could also achieve equality.222
This view of equal bargaining was closely aligned with the current
of thought which advocated the redistribution of income to increase
purchasing power.
Although Llewellyn did not address
redistribution of income, he was concerned with equal bargaining
power. 223

This concern re-emerged years later when Llewellyn

indicated, in the first drafts of the UCC, that trade standards should
be fixed by equal bargaining. 224 Llewellyn was concerned about
one-sided standardized contracts.2 5
See GALAMBOS, supra note 170, at 206-207.
2

See Effect, supra note 9, at 674 (citing Robert L. Hale, Law Making by Unofficial

Minorities, 20 COLUM. L. REv. 451, 452-54 (1920)); Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution
in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI.
470 (1923).
See also MORTON J.
HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw, 1870-1960, 195 (1992). Horowitz
explained that Robert Lee Hale was the most influential heir of the institutional economists.
He wrote that
Hale's pathbreaking"Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State"
(1923) is the model for several Realist critiques of the premises of legal and economic
orthodoxy. First, it is one of the earliest rigorous criticisms of the orthodox ideal of
voluntariness in market exchange. Since all market transactions are affected by the
prior distribution of property and entitlements, Hale argued, the market was in fact
an organized form of coercion of the weak by the strong. The decision to "withhold'-not to buy in the market or not to employ labor-was simply another form
of assertion of economic power.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Hale portrayed the market "as an interlocking system of power
relations, not as some abstract voluntary meeting of the minds or convergence of wills." Id.
at 196.
2 See TWINING, supra note 43, at 307.
225 See Effect, supra note 9, at 673 (explaining how lopsided contracts emerge when one
party has a stronger bargaining position); see also KARL N. LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON THE LAW OF SALES, 51 (1930). Llewellyn's Casebook states the following:
The principal case presents a court dealing with what the court apparently considers
such a contract. Note that if the contract form has become really standardized
among competitors, or if the other bargaining party is at a bargaining disadvantage
(the small apartment renter, the factory laborer, the shipper of goods by railroad,
the purchaser of steel or of insurance), we have something approaching legislation
by one group on its relations with another group. In this aspect the work of the
I.C.C. and the regulation of insurance policies become exceedingly interesting. The
unwillingness of courts to declare a clause void merely because it works unfairness
leads to their merely knocking out one clause after another because it does not
clearly express the position contended for; which, in turn, means a fresh chance for
the counsel of the one party to accomplish the desired result in his new form.
Id. at 51. Llewellyn, citing to Isaacs' discussion of a balanced standardized contract, which
he tried to incorporate in the UCC, further indicated:
Isaacs has pointed out that the whole law of partnership or sales is a sort of
standardized contract-frame into which the parties' expressed intention is fitted, and
out of which their "contract" as to any unforeseen emergency, is drawn. But this
law-made standard differs from the ordinary standardized contract of the present

Q.
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Since a laissez-faire system did not yield fair results, the state or
someone had to regulate the coercion present in the markets. The
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), NIRA, and the UCC were all
intended to achieve equal bargaining. Under the NIRA, standards
of fair competition were to be set by representative groups of
businessmen.226 The NLRA was an attempt to set wages and
working conditions by fair collective bargaining between unions and
employers.227 Moreover, in the first drafts of the UCC, usages of
trade were to be set by equal bargaining.228
4. "Reasonableness"-Does it Mean Anything?
One wonders if "reasonable" meant the same thing to Llewellyn
and Commons.
Did Llewellyn, like Commons, believe that
reasonable meant the result of bargaining among equals? Such a
reasonableness standard objectively focuses on what the parties
would have agreed on given equal bargaining power. This standard
also answers the objections of critics who find meaningless the use
of "reasonable," "reasonably," "commercially reasonable," and
"seasonable" in Article 2 of the UCC.229

day in having grown up out of the balance of contentions on both sides.
Id. (citing Nathan Isaacs, The Standardizingof Contracts, 27 YALE L.J. 34 (1917)).
" National Industrial Recovery Act, 15 U.S.C. § 703 (1988), ruled unconstitutional by
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (indicating that "[ulpon
the application to the President by one or more trade or industrial associations or groups, the
President may approve a code or codes of fair competition for the trade or industry or
subdivision thereof, represented by the applicant or applicants... ").
" National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988). This purpose is clear
from the policy behind the NLRA. Congress stated:
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organize
and bargain collectively ...promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain
recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices
fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of
differences as to wages, hours, or other working conditions, and restoring equality
of bargaining power between employers and employees.
Id.
28 See, e.g., NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS,
Proposed Final Draft No. 1: Uniform Revised Sales Act (1944), reprinted in 2 UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE DRAFTS 1, 110 (Elizabeth S. Kelly ed., 1984) (indicating that "[nlothing
could be stronger evidence of a time for any action being in fact reasonable than the fixing of
a time by a fair agreement"). See TWINING, supra note 43, at 303 (explaining that the UCC's
official purpose was to preserve flexibility in commercial transactions through customs, usages
and agreements of parties).
"' David Mellinkoff, The Languageof the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 YALE L.J. 185, 212
(1967).
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Academics and politicians had been concerned with reallocation of
bargaining power prior to the 1950s. However, the idea of imposing
standards based on equal bargaining power, died in the drafting
process. The UCC rejected an objective standard of reasonableness
based on what two equal parties would have agreed to and,
instead,
230
unconscionability.
of
term
undefined
vague,
the
favored
V. PRACTICAL ISSUES BETWEEN PRACTICAL MEN-INTERWAR
ECONOMICS IN PRACTICE
A.

Rejection of Laissez-Faire

Although this Article has described the intellectual history of the
interwar era, these ideas were not only theoretical, but also formed
the basis for the political action of those attempting to reform and
re-organize society. Many scholars previously mentioned in this
Article participated in government and legislation.23 ' The New
Deal era represented a rare period in American history where an

"o The Second Draft included a section on form contracts that was eventually withdrawn.
See R. U.S.A, supra note 40, § 1-C, at 331-32 (providing for written, agreed upon rules of trade
to be incorporated into particular trade contracts and for means of distinguishing bargained
and unilaterally imposed terms in printed forms). The form contract problem is now handled
by an unconscionability section which allows a court to refuse to enforce unconscionable
clauses or whole contracts. U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (1994). This section provides:
[i]f the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to
have been unconscionable at the time it.was made the court may refuse to enforce
the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause
as to avoid any unconscionable result.
Id. However, the principle of unconscionability "is one of the prevention of oppression and
unfair surprise... and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining
power." Id. cmt. 1 (citations omitted); NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS, ProposedFinalDraft: Uniform CommercialCode (1950), reprintedin 10 UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE DRAFTS 1, 117 (Elizabeth S. Kelly ed., 1984). See also NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, Uniform Commercial Code (1948),
reprinted in 6 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE DRAFTS 1, 83-84 (Elizabeth S. Kelly ed., 1984)
(indicating that unconscionability in the 1949 Code was to compensate for unequal bargaining
power).
"' For example, John Commons was active in Wisconsin government and instituted the
first workman's compensation system. DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY, supra note 5,
at 176-80 (Supp. III 1973). Jerome Frank worked in the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, Federal Surplus Relief Corporation and the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Id. at 215-16 (Supp. VI 1980). Thurman Arnold led FDR administration's efforts
to stop anti-competitive business practices. Id. at 16-17 (Supp. VIII 1988). See also supra
notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
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elite group of intellectuals ascended to positions of power.232
Moreover, these intellectuals felt that FDR's predecessors had failed
and therefore they viewed FDR's election as a mandate for significant economic changes and a new economic order.233
Some economists have divided these New Dealers into the
following groups: (1) advocates of more competition; and (2)
advocates of systematic organization and planning as well as
conscious and sensible administrative control of economic processes
which would "restore economic balance and prevent future breakdowns" (economic planners).23 4
The economic planners have been further divided according to
where they fell in the political spectrum.23 5 Economic planners on
the left were characterized as those "who would deprive businessmen
of their power and transfer much of it to the state or to organized
non-business groups."23 6 The economic planners on the right were
considered "industrialists and pro-business planners ... who felt
that an enlightened business leadership, operating through selfgoverning trade associations, should make most of the
decisions."23 v Hamilton and Frank were members of the first
group of planners which advocated giving power to the state or nonbusiness groups.2 38 Llewellyn was a member of the second group

232

See DONALD R. BRAND,

CORPORATISM AND THE RULE OF LAw:

A STUDY

OF THE NATIONAL

RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION 81-82 (1988) (explaining that FDR sought out a group of
intellectuals, referred to as the "Brain Trust," to channel "people and ideas from the university
into his administration").
232 Id. at 81. Brand indicated that FDR's election "ushered into power a new political elite,"
who would attempt to institute a new economic order. Id. "The business elites and their
political allies who had run the nation in the 1920s had failed, and the 1932 election had
provided a mandate for radical changes." Id. This "new order that Roosevelt envisioned
would rely primarily on cooperation rather than competition and on nonlegal modes of conflict
resolution rather than on the rule of law. Disciplined cooperation for the sake of the common
good would have to replace undisciplined individualism and the narrow focus on maximizing
profits." Id.
24 ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY: A STUDY IN
ECONOMIC AMBIVALENCE 13, 36 (1966) (warning that this division is useful but not precise and
that "[iut was much more complex" since individuals "refused to accept ideological systems
intact and then stick to a given position").
2'5 Id. at

12-13.

23 Id. at 13.
23 Id. (indicating that these "pro-business planners" thought that the Depression was
caused by "chiseling"and "cutthroat competition").
" See HAMILTON & WRIGHT, supra note 24, at 6 (noting the problems associated with
business groups regulating the industry); see also FRANK, supra note 30, at 406-407
(explaining that without government involvement businesses would not operate efficiently or
productively).
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which wanted business or trade associations to make the
decisions.239
The economic system ofself-governing business groups, advocated
by Llewellyn and other economic planners on the right and in which
governmental powers could be exercised by economic or vocational
groups, has been called the "business commonwealth."240
Examined in this light, Article 2 was intended to establish a
business commonwealth.
The attempts to organize business and save it from the chaos of
laissez-faire fell into the following four stages: (1) the trade association movement of the twenties; (2) the NRA's attempt to
institute a measure of corporatism and collectivism;24 ' (3) the
NRA's failure, demonstrated by the Supreme Court's ruling that the
NIRA was unconstitutional,242 and the creation and strengthening
of agencies like the National Labor Relations Board,24 the Agricultural Adjustment Administration,"' and the Federal Trade Commission; 245 and (4) the emergence of Keynesians and World War II.
The UCC, which was Llewellyn's attempt to continue the program
of the NIRA and the business commonwealth ideal by other means,
was part of the third stage.
B.

Trade Associations

Although businessmen, as opposed to academics, created the trade
association movement, that movement is consistent with the
anthropologists' and institutional economists' emphasis on group,
"' See Good, supra note 151, at 263 (stating that "[a] man's rights must be accessible, but
to be right rights, they must call also for some share on his part in initiating or in working
out their procurement, their fulfillment. Else law remains remote, the government becomes
an enemy or a dairy-cow. . ").
240 See HAWLEY, supra note 234, at 36-37.
"' See BRAND, supra note 232, at 92 (discussing societal corporatism and the cooperative
relationship between business and labor based on collective bargaining).
22 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935) (holding
NIRA codes unconstitutional as an attempted delegation of legislative power to the executive
branch).
23 See BELLUSH, supra note 10, at 179 (discussing the passage of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) as an attempt to create a more friendly environment for labor relations
after the invalidation of the NRA).
4 See Theda Skocpol & Kenneth Feingold, State Capacity and Economic Intervention in
the Early New Deal, 97 POL. SCI. Q. 255, 258 (explaining that the AAA was more successful
in organizing farmers than the NRA was in organizing industrial capitalists).
See BRAND, supra note 232, at 221 (stating that "the FTC was the foremost institutional
24
guardian of the antitrust legacy, and it had historically objected to many forms of industrial
stabilization").
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and not individual or state, control. The trade association movement
was an important means of regulating commerce and it laid a
foundation for the NRA.24 Trade associations set quality standards and trade practices in the area of sales. The movement's pervasiveness is illustrated by the fact that both Herbert Hoover and
FDR were involved in the American Construction Council.24 v
Moreover, the Merchants' Association of New York, a trade association, drafted the proposed Federal Sales Act that was the
impetus for the UCC.248
The trade associations were trying to achieve stabilization,
cooperation, and control.249 Starting with the "dinner-club" associations in the nineteenth century, trade associations and
government bureaucrats began working together to promote
industrial stability and economic rationalization.25 ° By the twenties, trade associations began taking on identities separate from
their members.25 ' They tried to regulate industries and impose
standards on both members and nonmembers.252 In addition, the
Department of Commerce, headed by Herbert Hoover, promulgated
ethical codes and assisted the growth of trade associations.253
The trade association movement was, in part, a response by small
businesses to the increasing size and power of large corporations.2 54 The associations lobbied for a revision of the antitrust laws so that they could effectively organize competition.255
These associations, supported by their members, began to advocate

See id. at 150.
" Id. at 4. In fact, FDR and Herbert Hoover, then Secretary of Commerce, founded the
Council in 1922 "to prevent 'unfair competition' within the construction industry, to stabilize
and cartelize the industry, and to develop planning through the imposition of codes of 'ethicS.'
Id.
" Hiram Thomas, The FederalSales Bill As Viewed by the Merchantand the Practitioner,
26 VA. L. REv. 537, 543-44 (1940).
"' See GALAMBOS, supra note 170, at 10.
250 See id. at 33-36, 44. At first, "dinner-club" associations worked out price and production
controls through committees or informal contacts. Id. However, since the associations were
self-regulated, some industries experienced cutthroat competition and excess capacity
problems. Id. Therefore, in an effort to stabilize the industry, it was important for the
government and manufacturers to work together. Id.
"5'See BRAND, supra note 232, at 92 (explaining how trade associations were not merely
representing members' interests but "were incorporated into the administrative apparatus of
the NRA (administrative corporation) with the expectation that they would subordinate their
economic self-interest to broader national goals").
252 Id. at 93.
23 Id. at 150.
254 Id.
2A

255 Id. at 151.
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an increased government role in order to create cooperation and
bring chiselers into line.2 56 This vision of a "business commonwealth" would be achieved with the assistance of government
agencies which would promulgate rules and codes of practice to
promote cooperation and prosperity.25 7
C.

The NRA

Trade associations could not control prices and production without
government authority. In establishing industry standards, associations could not set production quotas or prices for fear of
violating the Sherman Antitrust Act.2 58
The government,
therefore, while enabling "self-government in industry," had to play
a supervisory role by "advising and supporting business leaders,
enforcing business decisions, assisting in the organization of the
more backward trades, and rounding up any stray chiselers that
were not as yet convinced
that what was good for their industry was
29
them."
for
also good
Therefore, associations needed some government support,
involvement, and control to combat the chaos of the Depression.2 6 °
The NIRA was such a support mechanism. Like most political

26 BRAND, supra note 232, at 151-52 (indicating that "[the possibility of using the coercive
powers of the state to bring uncooperative 'price chiselers' into line appealed greatly to the
organizationally disadvantaged, who had no other means to effect market stabilization").
" See HAWLEY, supra note 234, at 11. Hawley suggests that there was a vision of a
business commonwealth, which sought to set up a benevolent capitalism under which everyone
would be happy and prosperous:
The result was a rapid burgeoning of trade associations, a rationale that justified
their anticompetitive activities, and a public policy under which such agencies as the
Department of Commerce and the Federal Trade Commission helped these
associations to standardize their products, expand their functions, and formulate
codes of proper practices, codes that generally regarded a price cutter as a "chiseler"
and price competition as immoral. If the official propaganda of these business
organizations could be believed, the nation had entered a new era of cooperative
activities, an era in which poverty and class conflict would disappear, business
would discipline itself, and everyone would benefit from the joint action of
enlightened business leaders.
Id.
28 See, e.g., Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344,359 (1933) (holding that
a selling agency composed of several coal producers did not violate the Sherman Antitrust Act
because it did not have "monopoly control of any market nor the power to fix monopoly
prices").
2'9 HAWLEY, supra note 234, at 38-39.
2'o See generally BELLUSH, supra note 10, at 5 (indicating that a partnership between
government and trade associations was necessary to combat unethical businessmen who
decreased wages and the quality of production).
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programs, the NIRA was a political compromise."' The NIRA
attempted to chart a middle course between an aggressive policy of
competition with strict enforcement of antitrust laws and a policy of
vigorous government control of the economy. The NIRA allowed
business groups to regulate themselves without violating the
antitrust laws.2" 2 The philosophy behind the 2 6NIRA was an
outgrowth of the "business commonwealth" vision.
A more left wing "second vision" of the NIRA existed along side
this vision of an enlightened, scientific, and cooperative business
community running American industry. This vision viewed the
NIRA as a step to "a collectivist democracy engaged in purposeful
national planning."264 Business would be put under the discipline
of scientific management in a regime inspired, in part, by
institutional economist Thorstein Veblen.265
The trade groups' greatest obstacle to achieving a business
commonwealth by regulating their members' trade practices was the
groups' lack of coercive authority.266 To police their members, the
groups had to share in the sovereign power of the state.2 67 As
indicated previously, the prevalent view, which was shared by
Roosevelt, Llewellyn, Bernard Baruch, and leaders of trade as-

261 See WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL 57 (1963)
(indicating that FDR ordered the committee drafting the NIRA to be locked in a room until
they drafted a bill which reflected compromise on all sides).
262 Id. at 57-58 (pointing out that government allowed business to draft code agreements
which were exempt from antitrust laws). See BELLUSH, supra note 10, at 5 (discussing FDR's
goal of having trade standards that would be exempt from antitrust laws but monitored by the
government). But see id. at 29 (pointing out the inconsistency in the NIRA since one part
exempted the codes from antitrust laws and another provided that no code shall allow
monopolies or antitrust violations).
262 HAWLEY, supra note 234, at 42 (stating that "the prophets of the business commonwealth
were able to write some of their ideas into the National Industrial Recovery Act"). See id. at
8-9 (stating that competition would be rationalized through a program that would "repeal the
Sherman Act, encourage business organization, and allow self-governing trade associations,
loosely supervised by federal authorities, to rationalize competition, improve business ethics,
and handle the nation's social problems").
264 Id. at 43.
265 Id.
266 See Jaffe, supra note 115, at 202.
" Id. Jaffe explains the associations' problem when he indicates that "the most significant
and powerful components of the social structure are economic groups." Id. at 201. However,
in theory, the only legitimate entity is the "organization of citizens territorially. . . . This
community is the state. This activity is the law!" Id. at 201. The economic groups, however,
demand power. This is "in part a demand for groups privileges over against the rest of
society; in part a demand by the more explicit elements in a group that the group as a
corporate body be given power to coerce under the sanction of law dissentient members of the
group." Id. at 202.
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sociations and labor unions, was that the only way to cure the
nation's economic ills was to control the "scabs" and "chiselers."2 s
The NIRA put such police power in the groups' hands.26 9
There were other social and philosophic bases for the NIRA.
Many theorists believed that industry solutions had to be industry
specific. 7 ° The NIRA, which was based on the belief that group
empowerment would lead to individual empowerment, 2 7 ' provided
an opportunity for groups to develop group-specific solutions.2 7 2
Moreover, the administrative regulation of the NRA would make law
less remote to individuals.2 73
Thus, localized and trade-specific self-regulation would likely be
both more efficient and more empowering than remote public
administration. 27 4 The NRA, therefore, sought to regulate the
economy by empowering trade groups to regulate themselves.2 75
The trade group was to establish codes of fair competition that
would stamp out chiseling.2 76 Violations of these codes would lead
to criminal prosecutions.2 77 In return, labor would obtain guaran-

is

See supra notes 206-13 and accompanying text.
See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 261, at 65 (indicating that the fair practice code would
"eliminate eye-gouging and knee-groining and ear-chewing in business").
270 See Effect, supra note 9, at 667 (indicating that a major legal problem was fitting the law
to the specific problems of the group in question and that "the outstanding legal problem of
the day [was] ... how common, general rules, judge-made or statutory, are to control
transactions under high specialization").
27' See Good, supra note 151, at 263 (describing how the Tennessee Valley Authority was
a government agency that was working to empower the average citizen); see also COMMONS,
supra note 66, at 27-30 (alluding to this empowerment by explaining the power of collective
action and that the individual is puny by himself or herself but powerful when acting in
concert with others).
272 See BELLUSH, supra note 10, at 25 (indicating that FDR intended to use trade and
industrial associations to create codes).
27s See Good, supra note 151, at 261 (describing how administrative regulation had the
potential to make law clear and meaningful to individuals, and indicating that "this is best
bodied forth in legislation, when well drawn, with lines of policy that any interested man can
understand, made clear, with technical detail left then to be handled flexibly by administrative
regulation").
"' See Jaffe, supra, note 115, at 212 (indicating that "[plarticipation in management
satisfies the craving for self-expression, for power"); see also Good, supra note 151, at 263
(discussing the remoteness of traditional government and the virtues of citizen involvement
which may be an unstated reference to Jaffe).
275 See BELLUSH, supra note 10, at 37-38 (indicating that members of trade groups were
appointed to advisory boards and helped create the codes).
276 See id. at 36-38 (discussing the fair practice codes).
2' See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (involving
an individual charged with criminal violation of the Live Poultry Code).
29
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tees of minimum wages and maximum hours and the right to engage
in collective bargaining.27
The specific industry codes were usually proposed by trade
associations.279 The proposing group conferred with NRA officials
and the NRA's three advisory boards representing labor, businesses,
and consumers.2 8° After this group reached a consensus on a code,
a public hearing was held.281 Following consideration of any new
proposals, the code was sent to the NRA administrator, who then
forwarded it to the President for final approval.282 The process of
code adoption was similar to that proposed by Llewellyn to fix trade
usage under the Proposed Sales Act. s" The NRA codes of fair
competition were to become a "law merchant" for the relevant
industry.284
The NIRA "was the most ambitious attempt to institute societal
corporatism in American political history."28 5 It attempted to
transform laissez-faire competition into one of cooperation.86
Fortunately or unfortunately, the NIRA failed. Therefore, the UCC
was an attempt to salvage the ideals of cooperation and group power
out of the wreckage of the NIRA.
D. The Failureof the NRA
The NRA's code-making process turned out to be more complex,
protracted, and difficult than expected. The more powerful companies dominated code-making, making it burdensome on small
businesses. 287

Businessmen objected to the wage, hour, and

collective bargaining provisions as the precursors to strikes and
labor unrest.288 The problem of enforcing detailed codes of fair
competition became insurmountable. Policing service industries
with many small establishments was similarly difficult. The
growing alienation of businessmen from the New Deal made the
program, which depended upon business cooperation, impossible to

278
279
280

FREIDEL, supra note 189, at 104.
BELLUSH, supra note 10, at 37.
id.

281Id.
282 Id.

s
2
286

R.U.S.A., supra note 40, at 332.
BRAND, supra note 232, at 11 (emphasis added).
Id. at 92.
Id.

287 See FREIDEL, supra note 189, at 136.
2"8 See id. at 137-38.
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operate.2" 9 Ultimately, the NRA's futile attempt to establish fair
competition undermined the program.2"
Thus, the NIRA was already discredited when A.L.A Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States2 9 ' (Schechter Poultry) reached the
Supreme Court. However, when the Court declared the NIRA's
delegation of sovereign power to private groups unconstitutional, the
NIRA's crucial feature of permitting group empowerment and control
was eliminated.2 "
Modern administrative treatises do not view Schechter Poultry in
these terms. These texts treat this case as a "delegation" problem
without differentiating delegations to provide groups from
delegations to administrative agencies.2 93 The delegation under
the NIRA was not to an agency, but to trade associations, industrial
associations or groups upon the President's approval. 2"
In Schechter Poultry, the United States charged the defendants,
wholesale slaughterers of poultry, with selling diseased and
uninspected poultry in violation of labor standards.29
The
government argued that the regulations were justified because
diseased poultry "is necessarily disposed of through misrepresentations as to its condition, and causes distrust and a reluctance to
purchase on the part of consumers."2" The presence of inexpensive diseased poultry forced the sellers of good poultry to decrease
their own prices to remain competitive.297 In addition, low wages
paid to laborers also caused price cutting.29 The Court of Appeals
noted that all "these conditions brought about an industrial
demoralization which, with all its adverse national consequences,
needed correction and betterment."2 "

" See BRAND, supra note 232, at 105 (concluding that, by the end of 1934, "the social
consensus necessary for the NRA simply did not exist").
'0 See id. at 119.
29'295 U.S. 495 (1935).
292

Id. at 537.

293 See, e.g., KENNETH C. DAvIs & RICHARD J. PIERCE, ADMINISTRATWVE LAW TREATISE § 2.6
(3d ed. 1994).

2 National Industrial Recovery Act, 15 U.S.C. § 703 (1988) (original version at ch. 90,

§ 3,

48 Stat. 195 (1933), ruled unconstitutionalby Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495 (1935)).

"' United States v. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 76 F.2d 617, 618 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 295
U.S. 495 (1935).
296 Id. at 619.
297 Id.
298
9

Id.

Id.
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The Supreme Court, however, held that the NIRA was an
impermissible delegation. 3" The court concluded that the "codes
of fair competition" promulgated under the NIRA were not limited
to "unfair competitive practices" under existing law, but authorized
"wise and beneficient [sic] measures for the government of trades
and industries."'
Such a delegation, the Court held, was illegitimate
since
it
lacked
standards for any trade, industry or
30 2
activity.

The Supreme Court's invalidation of the NIRA in Schechter
Poultry spurred the New Deal into action."03
After reading
telegrams from small businessmen complaining of cutthroat

'o A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935).
30'

Id. at 535.

.02Id. at 541.

Compare U.C.C. § 1-205 (1994) (delegating to trades and industries the

power to set standards of usage and fair dealing). Additionally, the UCC allows the banking
industry to set the standard of ordinary care through "clearing-house rules and the like or
with a general banking usage." Id. at § 4-103(c).
Llewellyn disagreed with the Supreme Court's decision in Schechter Poultry. See On
Warranty I, supra note 45, at 713, 721. Llewellyn believed that group or state requirements
of good faith and fair dealing were a prerequisite for economic prosperity. In support of this
view, Llewellyn stated:
Let government (guild or general) step out (as it did), and you have a void. Voids
are uncomfortable. That is, they are uncomfortable under some conditions. If your
notion of commerce is the wandering peddler, the horse-trader, the side-show at the
fair, then you think well of arm's-length bargaining, single-occasion deals, and devil
take the fool. If, on the other hand, you think of trade in terms of goodwill and
future business, you will find no hardship in imposing on a seller various obligations
resting in first essence on good faith, and then on contract: what did he agree to
deliver? The progression is from "any man in selling will affirm that his wares are
good" (arm's-length), through "one must not conceal what he knows, or ought to
know" (tort), into "This is what he has agreed to deliver" (contract); then, into: this
is what he must answer, generally, for putting on the market (res ipsa loquitur, and
third party warranty); and finally, into central regulation: he must, on pain of
exclusion or fine (guild or association) or confiscation, fine, or imprisonment (state),
show publicly the content of his ware; or even: wares of less than a given standard
he shall not put out.... [Riepeat orders are what a seller needs; to stand behind
words, and even behind wares-without-words, is good business for the seller-and
is therefore good policy for a court to encourage. Transactions look to future
delivery; even where they do not, they look to standard quality of goods produced in
mass and grade, and sold by name, brand, or description. Distribution of goods is
indirect, almost as of course; a buyer has only his dealer to trust to; it is a dealer's
business to know the goods he sells. As between dealers (even as between retaildealer and consumers), standing relations mean goodwill; and goodwill is what
makes turnover; and turnover is what makes the balance-sheet wax fat. Confidence,
not trickery, is the basis of prosperity.
Id.
303 See FREIDEL, supra note 189, at 160.

HeinOnline -- 59 Alb. L. Rev. 380 1995-1996

19951

Between-the-Wars Social Thought

competition, 3°4 FDR attacked the Supreme Court for Schechter
30 5
Poultry.

FDR intensified this attack with his ill-fated court-

packing plan."° In the aftermath of the NIRA's collapse, the New
Dealers sought new ways to modernize the economy, end the
Depression, and restore prosperity.
VI.

THE POST-SCHECHTER ERA

After Schechter Poultry, the debate over economic policy reemerged. Some New Dealers proposed cartelization, with the setting
of minimum prices, production quotas, product standards, and labor
practices. 7 The economic planners argued for managed systems
of production and pricing. 8 ' The UCC emerged in the period
between Schechter Poultry and Pearl Harbor. °9
After SchechterPoultry, proponents ofthe business commonwealth
"were still proposing ways to get around the court decision and reestablish a policy 'of cooperative self-regulation,'" and a program
that would "'defend industry from the chiseler.'" 10 A trade
association official proposed that the federal government grant each
national organized trade association the right to draft and legally
enforce its own ethical codes.3"'
The increasing alienation between business and the Roosevelt
Administration made such a plan impossible for the federal
government. While business increasingly viewed the New Deal as
being anti-property and against the ideological foundations of
business, Roosevelt also grew disillusioned with the failure of
business to cooperate. 12 A set of specific laws designed to solve
3o Id. at 162 (one telegram sent to Roosevelt from a small businessman read: "Chiselers
already at our throats and have begun choking us. Need immediate action").

so' Id. at 163. In protest, Roosevelt stated: "We are the only nation in the world that has
not solved that problem. We thought we were solving it, and now it has been thrown right
straight in our faces and we have been relegated to the horse-and-buggy definition of
interstate commerce." Id.
306

Id. at 194.

'07 See HAWLEY, supra note 234, at 150.
38 See id. at 172. The economic planners' stronghold was the Agricultural Adjustment
Administration, where Jerome Frank was serving, and which still administers such
management over the agricultural economy today.
.0 The first drafts of the UCC were completed in 1940 and 1941.
3 0 See HAWLEY, supra note 234, at 149.

.. Id. The UCC's definition of"good faith" allows a trade association to do just that. See
U.C.C. § 2-103 (1994) (allowing a trade association to set its own ethical standards since good
faith, in the case of merchants, 'means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade").
312 See HAWLEY, supra note 234, at 152-55.
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particular problems or regulate specific industries followed the
failure of the NIRA.
The work of the NRA was subdivided and parceled out to various
agencies.31 The National Labor Relations Board took over the
labor sections from the NRA.314 Production codes and regulations
were passed for the coal, transportation, and communication industries." 5
Oil also became subject to state production
16
controls.
Production codes 'were proposed, but not enacted for,
the cotton, textile, lumber, apparel, and anthracite coal industries.317 Note that the "capture" theory of regulation of
industries understates the case. In the New Deal, the agency was
supposed to be captured from the beginning. The agency's purpose
was to enforce the desires of the industry legally.
Finally, at the end of the thirties, the New Deal gave up on the
ideal of the business commonwealth which was characterized by
business-government cooperation. Business had been unable to
cooperate under the NIRA and became increasingly alienated from
the New Deal.1 ' Roosevelt changed course again and flirted with
Keynesianism and a vigorous antitrust program. 9
Shortly
thereafter, the nation was preparing for war and the Depression era
was over.32" Llewellyn, however, still sought to control "chiseling"

s3 Id. at 159-62.
314 See BRAND, supra note 232, at 251.
315 See HAWLEY, supra note 234, at 207, 233-34.

Id. at 214.
Id. at 220, 223-24. For examples of the New Deal era's legislation which replaced
unregulated competition with sharing markets by cartels, planning, and enforcement of group
norms see: Fair Trade (Miller-Tyding) Act, ch. 690, Title VIII, 50 Stat. 693 (1937) (current
version at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994)) (originating and succeeding in protecting small retail business
from chain-stores, mail-order firms, and supermarkets by prohibiting price discrimination
between retailers, calling for equal advertising allowances, banning predatory price cutting,
and limiting quantity discounts); Bituminous Coal (Guffey-Vinson) Act of 1937, ch. 127 §§ 122, 50 Stat. 72 (1937) (formerly codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 828-52 (1988), repealed by Pub. L. No.
89-554, § 8(a), 80 Stat. 649, 651 (1966)) (regulating the bituminous coal industry); Merchant
Marine Act of 1936, ch. 858, § 201, 49 Stat. 1985 (1936) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C.
§§ 1104-1294 (1988)); Motor Carrier Act, ch. 498, pt. II, § 201, 49 Stat. 543 (1935) (originally
codified in 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-327 (1976), recodified as amended in scattered sections of 49
U.S.C. (1988)); Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, § 201, 52 Stat. 973 (1938) (originally
codified in 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1976), repealed in part and recodified in part in scattered
sections of 49 U.S.C. by Pub. L. No. 103-272, § 7(b), 108 Stat. 1379 (1994)). The original drafts
of the UCC are also an example of this type of legislation.
316
317

318 See FREIDEL, supra note 189, at 256.

9 See id. at 255-57. FDR appointed Thurman Arnold as head of the Antitrust Division,
and increased the Division's lawyers from 18 to 300. Id.
120 See id.
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and establish standards of good faith and quality in his Revised
Sales Act.
A.

Trade Self-Regulation

The UCC keeps the dream of the business commonwealth, with
each trade regulating its own affairs, alive. Although the UCC does
not provide for resale price, maintenance, or restrictions on output,
the UCC allows the trade group to regulate commerce through its
key device of "usage of trade" which defines the terms of the
contract, good faith, and product quality.32 ' The UCC permits the
type of trade self-governance that the Supreme Court in Schechter
Poultry held patently unconstitutional.322
Llewellyn sought to realize the goals of the NIRA and to modernize sales by moving away from individual bargaining toward trade
group regulation.323 The UCC's insistence on "reasonableness" also
limits the freedom of contract by allowing courts to police commercial agreements.324 Moreover, the UCC's use of "usage of trade"
constituted a radical change in contract law.325 A trade usage
governs a contract even if the parties were unaware of it or intended
not to be bound by it.326

321

U.C.C. § 1-205(2) (1994).

322 See id. at § 1-205 (1994).

2 See On WarrantyI, supranote 45, at 713. In the UCC, Llewellyn made contracts subject
to "usage of trade" and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in
the trade. See U.C.C. § 1-205 (1994) (usage of trade and standards of fair dealing). Moreover,
the UCC sets up a standardized contract of sale in Part 3 of Article Two that governs unless
the parties contract otherwise. Id. at §§ 2-201 to 2-210, 2-314. See also Austin T. Wright, Opposition of the Law to Business Usages, 26 COLUM. L. REv. 917, 938 (1926) (pointing out that
allowing business usages to control obligations between merchants conflicts with the
consensual theory of contracts).
"2 See U.C.C. §§ 2-205, 2-206, 2-207, 2-305, 2-309, 2-513, 2-602, 2-607, 2-608, 2-610 (1994)
(employing reasonableness standards).
32'See id. at § 1-205 cmt. 1.
...See R. U.S.A., supra note 40, at 332. The draft encouraged trade groups to promulgate
their own standards:
(1) The balanced "Association"type of "Rules"* General provisions in an Act cannot
do particular justice to the particular conditions of the wholesale trade in grain, or
furs, or dried fruit, or fresh produce. What general provisions can do, is to leave
usage of trade free to modify or displace the general provisions. Butproof of usage
of trade, especially before a jury, is expensive and uncertain. Even before a
merchant-tribunal the results of proof of such usage of trade must abide the event,
and some upsets are inevitable. Moreover, usage may be unclear, or in process of
change, or different as between the market the seller knows and the market familiar
to the buyer. It is, therefore, wisdom for those engaged in a particular trade to get
together on a clear and specialized articulate statement in advance of such usages
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StandardizedRules

By
The UCC also establishes a standardized contract.327
employing "standardized contracts," the UCC sets forth a group of
rules that exemplify Isaac's observation that such rules will supplant
individual bargaining unless the parties take the trouble to contract
out of them. These rules provide "a whole background of solutions
for any matter which as a whole is sufficiently reasonable and fair
not to need to be bargained about."328
The UCC's use of "reasonable" also moves away from individual
bargaining and towards regulation. Although reasonableness may
be vague, the UCC's use of that standard gives courts the power to
regulate the bargain and behavior of parties to sales contracts.329
The use in the proposed Federal33 Sales Act of "reasonableness" is also

inconsistent with laissez-faire.

0

C. Regulatory Ideals
In order to decrease disputes over quality standards, Llewellyn
advocated a shift from sole reliance on private litigation to regulate
sales law to a system encompassing such mechanisms as vertical

or changes in usage as they wish incorporated into their transactions. This the
section should recognize and seek to encourage.
Id.
827 See U.C.C. §§ 2-201 to 2-210, 2-301 to 2-328 (1994). See also R.U.S.A, supra note 40,
at 303. The introduction to the second draft discusses standardized contracts and indicates:
The second kind of framework is a sort of standardized contract, serving wherever
the parties have not particularized their bargain. It fills in and it fills out. Its office
is to provide not only reasonable and fair solutions for particular matters, but, no
less, a whole background of solutions for any matter, which as a whole is sufficiently
reasonable and fair not to need to be bargained about. This has always been the
effort of the courts; but the courts have had to work at the problem case by case and
rule by rule, piece by piece. When the law of a whole field comes to be stated, the
net balance of fifty or five hundred of these particular rules comes up for
examination and review.
Id.
38 R.U.S.A., supra note 40, at 303.
32 See DAVID MELLINKOFF, MELLINKOFF'S DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LEGAL USAGE 539

(1992) (stating that "Reasonable has no precise legal meaning. It is flexible. That is its virtue
and only utility for the law").
30 See Nathan Isaacs, The Sale in Legal Theory and In Practice, 26 VA. L. REV. 651, 652
(1940) ("This fondness for the 'reasonable price', as distinguished from the ideal of insisting
that the parties and not the courts shall make the contract, may look back to the middle ages
or forward to some New Deal, but obviously it excludes the Nineteenth Century from our
calculations.").
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integration, scientific purchasing, trade association standards, and
legislative regulations.331
For example, vertically integrated
businesses do not have to be concerned with intra-firm "sales. 332
Technical purchasing staffs, that specify what they want, do not
need implied warranties.3 3 Business associations could be encouraged to promulgate standards.3 4
Moreover, legislative
regulation, along with a system of civil liability, was necessary.335
Therefore, Llewellyn viewed litigation as a last resort which would
clean up any leftover problems.33 6
Although it is still private law, and thus the desired government
regulation is not present, Llewellyn's Code goes a long way toward
realizing the purposes of the NIRA. In addition to incorporating

" See On WarrantyII, supra note 8, at 395 & n.137.
See id.
33 See id.
s Id. at 395-96. Llewellyn stated:
"What will pass in the market" is sub-defined into distinguishable degrees or ratings
of "Be." or "H.P." or octane or acid content; or into "fancy," "choice," "table," and
"plain"-with rules for grading, as for instance that any one lowest or worst apple
in a box will govern, or that five percent of culls are permissible.
Id.
' Id. at 408. Llewellyn stated:
Legislative regulation can be three-fold at least, and can cumulate in action with
civil liability. This cumulation, instead of substitution, is one lesson that the 18th
and 19th centuries, in their alternation of inadequate attacks, suggest to the 20th.
Legislation, taking the major lines of regulation, can: (a) define standards of
quality, and provide official inspectors, to make contract language test up to what
it says; (b) lay down minimum standards, either in toto or for named grades, and
provide ways of dealing with would-be chisellers. This is Tudor regulation to keep
the exploited from having to use his own unpracticed judgment. It is colonial. It
lapses a little, in the 19th century. It is federal meat inspection as distinguished
from saying on the label to buyers who do not understand, that this product contains
blank percent of blank; (c) If the goal is clear, legislation can, between merchants
and in favor of consumers, knock out contrary contract, or can even penalize
attempts to make contrary contract.
All of which, wherever employed, seems to have led not only to better enforcement
of civil obligation, but toward the major end for which civil obligation itself exists:
to wit, the avoidanceof injury and dispute. It hardly needs saying, in addition, that
to keep the civil-obligation-side alive means presence of a useful social pressure to
keep the official inspectors on their social job. The 19th century does not show
failure of the civil obligation. It shows instead that civil obligation is magnificent,
when rightly handled-but not enough, however rightly handled.
Id.
6 See id. at 395-96. Llewellyn believed that warranty litigation would wither away. He
did not contemplate the present system of sales law in which warranty litigation is pervasive.
See generally U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 2313-18 (citing a multitude of cases dealing with
express and implied warranties, exclusion and conflict of warranties which illustrate the
prevalence of such litigation).
U2
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trade corporation standards, the Code provides for group selfmanagement, the policing of chiselers, and the imposition of group37
determined quality standards."
The UCC, which is the result of the imposition of regulatory ideas
on a system of private law, is a peculiar statute which displays, an
ambivalence between laissez-faire and regulation. For example,
under the UCC's treatment of warranty, merchants who sell goods
give a "warranty of merchantability" which is fixed by the group
norms of the trade.3 3 Goods must "pass without objection in the
trade under the contract description" 3 9 unless the implied warranty is excluded or modified.3 4 ° The UCC requires that the excluding
language "must mention merchantability and in case of a writing
must be conspicuous" and give methods to disclaim a warranty.3 4 1
However, a party's power to exclude warranties is limited by the
UCC's unconscionability section.342 In any case, the agreement
can provide for modifications and limitations of remedy, unless "circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its
essential purpose."34 3 Moreover, "at least minimum adequate
remedies [must] be available."3 " And, in any case, minimum
express warranties cannot be completely disclaimed.3 45 The UCC
thus displays an ambivalence between laissez-faire and state
imposition of standards of warranty and remedy.
D. Meeting the Challenges of Depression Conditions
The Depression, which preceded the initial drafts of the UCC, was
a period of great price fluctuations, chaotic business conditions, and
low levels of production and consumption.3 " It is not surprising

117

On Warranty II, supra note 8, at 395-96.

33" U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(a) (1994).
339

Id.

340

Id. at §§ 2-314(1), 2-316.
Id. at § 2-316(2)-(3) (identifying methods to disclaim a warranty).
Id. at § 2-302 (giving courts options where agreement is found to be unconscionable).

41
3

3s Id. at § 2-719(1)(a)-(2) (1994).
314 Id. at § 2-719 cmt. 1.
3" Id. at § 2-313 cmt. 4 (indicating that "the policy is adopted of those cases which refuse
except in unusual circumstances to recognize a material deletion of the seller's obligation").
141 See generally FREIDEL, supra note 189, at 248 (discussing the economic conditions
of the
depression). For example, the wholesale price index for all commodities declined from 50 in
1928 to 33.6 in 1932. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE U.S.,
COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, BICENTENNIAL EDITION, 199 (Part I 1975). Subsequently, the
wholesale price index rose to 44.5 by 1937 and fell to 39.8 in 1939. Id. It then started rising,
and did not fall by more than 4.1 points again. Id.
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that buyers sought to get out of contracts and that sales law needed
to be changed to keep parties bound by an agreement. Many
sections of the Sales Article were drafted to meet this problem.347
UCC section 2-605 is a good illustration of this.348 Since section
2-605 can be traced back to a proposal specifically concerned with
price fluctuations, this section's purpose was to protect sellers from
buyers who reject because of falling markets.34 9
In proposing the language of section 2-605, Lawrence Eno
acknowledged Llewellyn's assistance.850 Therefore, Llewellyn was
7 Specifically, the following UCC sections were intended to make it easier for parties to
form contracts: § 2-305 (a party can make a contract without agreeing on a price); § 2-306 (a
specific quantity does not have to be included); § 2-308 (the parties do not have to agree on
the place of delivery); § 2-309 (time of performance does not have to be ascertained); § 2-311
(parties do not have to agree the details of performance); § 2-207 (a contract can come into
being despite an acceptance which adds new or different terms); § 2-204 (requiring no formal
offer or acceptance); § 2-201 (indicating that formal requirement are kept to a minimum).
Additionally, the following sections seek to preserve the contract once it is made: § 2-508 (the
seller may cure defects of tender); § 2-602 (the buyer must reject in a timely fashion). See Karl
N. Llewellyn, Through Title to Contractand a Bit Beyond, 15 N.Y.U. L. REV. 159, 208 (1938);
U.C.C. §§ 2-607 (1994) (indicating that revocation has a higher standard and is generally
unavailable except where goods are accepted with knowledge of nonconformity and a belief the
nonconformity will be cured). But see § 2-609 (stating that failure to provide the requesting
party with adequate assurances is anticipatory repudiation of the contract).
34
U.C.C. § 2-605 (1994). This section reads:
WAIVER OF BUYER'S OBJECTIONS BY FAILURE TO PARTICULARIZE.
(1) The buyer's failure to state in connection with rejection a particular defect which
is ascertainable by reasonable inspection precludes him from relying on the unstated
defect to justify rejection or to establish breach
(a) where the seller could have cured it if stated seasonably; or
(b) between merchants when the seller has after rejection made a request in
writing for a full and final written statement of all defects on which the buyer
proposes to rely.
Id.
'4 See id. at § 2-605 cmt. 2. See also NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS, Draft for a Uniform Sales Act (1940) reprinted in 1 UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE DRAFTS 171, 237 (Elizabeth S. Kelly ed., 1984). This states:
In a contract or sale between merchants, the seller may demand a full statement of
all objections on which the buyer is relying to justify any rejection, rescission or
cancellation. On such demand, the buyer must give notice within a reasonable time
of any objections which are reasonably ascertainable, or be barred from setting up
such objections in later litigation. Objections made by the buyer in the absence of
such demand do not bar the setting up of omitted objections unless the omission has
actually, reasonably, and materially misled the seller. The burden of proving such
reliance is on the seller. The burden of proving that an objection was not readily
ascertainable at the time of responding to a demand for full statement is on the
buyer.
Id. Similar language was contained in section 56 of the Second Draft. R. U.S.A, supra note
40, at 510.
350 Lawrence R. Eno, Price Movement and Unstated Objections to the Defective Performance
of Sales Contracts, 44 YALE L.J. 782, 816 (1935).
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aware of Eno's proposals. After considering economic conditions
from the early 1900s to the mid-1930s, Eno concluded that the factor
of depression was present in two-thirds of the cases decided in favor
of the seller.351 Eno believed that knowledge of the changes in
price levels was crucial for understanding the motivation behind
rejections. 352 Therefore, Eno proposed a statute to "put the burden
on the seller of demanding a formal statement of defects from the
buyer."35 3 The modern version of section 2-605 thus stems from
thirties scholarly thought about how to deal with Depression
conditions.354
Likewise, other UCC sections were also responses to the Depression. For example, Llewellyn recommended that the proposed
Federal Sales Act should include a provision allowing for easy resale
or cover in rapidly changing market conditions, with a neutral
appraiser to determine the state of the goods on delivery.35 ' These
simplified resale and cover provisions became part of the UCC.356
The right of the seller to cure improper tender or delivery was also
included in the UCC to prevent a buyer from rejecting on account of
falling markets.357
Commercial law had to be flexible in order to keep pace with the
rapidly changing Depression conditions. To achieve this flexibility,
the Second Draft of the proposed Sales Act solicited "advice and
information, especially from business men" on a "possible Section...
on Division of Risks by Contract and by Law."3 5' This proposed
section was to cover an emerging type of contractual relationship
"which deals with contract less as an arm's-length single deal than
as a getting together on a type of joint-venture; an approach which

s" Id. at 817.

.52Id. at 811 ("There are other cases where the drop in the market is so pronounced that
the failure of the court to stress this in words as probably the real reason for rejection is
almost unforgivable.").
151 Id. at 817.
...See id. at 817; see also U.C.C. § 2-605 (1994).
...See Karl N. Llewellyn, The Needed FederalSales Act, 26 VA. L. REV 558, 569-70 (1940).
3"6 U.C.C. §§ 2-706 to 2-716 (1994).
167 Id. at § 2-508. See also R.U.S.A., supra note 40, at 465. This states that
The situations involved are of two quite diverse types. The first involves a contract
which has become most unwelcome to the obligee (commonly because of a severe
change in the market), and involves an obligee who sits back waiting and hoping for
an error in tender. In such a case, errors should be curable, if they can be cured in
time; it is both uncommercial and unjust to "freeze a breach" unnecessarily.
Id.
...R.U.S.A., supra note 40, at 475.
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greatly modifies the pattern of sharp, whole-hog risk-placing which
underlies most of our legal doctrine of contract."359
The concepts described in the "Possible Section" are embodied in
the present UCC, which allows for a free readjustment of sales
contracts.3 60 The concept that "course of performance" determines
the parties' contractual rights36 ' deals with problems expressed in
a comment to the "Possible Section."362 UCC section 2-209, entitled "Modification, Recession and Waiver," also gives legal effect to
informal practices of adjustment to price changes that existed during
the Depression.363
Long-range planning and dealing required a less rigid law.364
Therefore, the UCC permits open price terms,365 output and
requirements contracts, and exclusive dealings contracts.366
Moreover, under the UCC a sales contract can be indefinite in
duration and can leave particulars of performance to be specified by
one of the parties.367 In permitting this, the UCC allowed the
merchant to cope with the rapidly changing, chaotic commercial
conditions characteristic of the Depression.

...Id. The comment indicates that even among honest merchants, fluctuating market
prices or changing conditions would cause price, time, amount or quality adjustments. Id. at
476.
160
See id. at 475-76 (discussing potential for eliminating risks inherent in arm's length
contracting); see also U.C.C. § 2-209 (1994) (allowing for modification without consideration);
U.C.C. §§ 2-613 to 2-615 (allowing substituted performance and excuse).
U.C.C. § 2-208 (1994).
862 See R.U.S.A, supra note 40, at 476 (stating that "a change in management, an
extraneous personal friction, or even the resignation of a particular contact-man, can throw
the machinery of adjustment completely out of gear").
363 U.C.C. § 2-209 cmt. 1 (1994).
864 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL SCIENCE Contract 333-34 (1931).
Indeed, such flexibility is a marked trend in marketing of goods as well, wherever
long range buyer-seller relations come to seem more important than exact definition
of the risks to be shifted by the particular dicker in terms of quantity, quality or
price: output and requirement contracts, maximum and minimum contracts,
contracts with quality - quantity and kinds to be specified from month to month and
sliding scale price arrangements are symptomatic of an economy stabilizing itself
along new lines.
Id. See generallyR. U.S.A, supra note 40, at 476 (discussing long term arrangements in which
the price is adjusted on a monthly basis to fit the market).
865 See U.C.C. § 2-305 cmt. 1 (1994).
366Id. at § 2-306 cmts. 2 & 5; see also R.U.S.A, supra note 40, at 374-75 (stating "[flor in
the past decades a growing practice has been noticeable, to close long range or seasonal supply
contracts with an eye more on assuring the movement of goods and the certaintyof supply than
on shifting the risk of rise and fall in the market").
867 See U.C.C. §§ 2-309 cmt. 7, 2-311 cmt. 1 (1994) (rejecting the older view that such open
terms invalidated the contract because of indefiniteness).
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Thus, the entire contractual framework of Article 2, including its
rejection of formal doctrines which made contracting difficult, and
provisions such as cover that keep contracts alive, were responses to
the problems created by the Depression.
VII.

THE LOST LEARNING-How WE LOST IT

My argument is simple. I have examined the works of scholars
such as Commons, Boas, Hale, Isaacs, Frank, and Sumner, whom
Llewellyn cites and credits in his writings, to answer the question:
"was there anything in the social and economic milieu that
influenced Llewellyn's thought?" I have also examined prevalent
social and economic concepts of the time, such as the chiseler and
collectivism, and have determined that these concepts affected
Llewellyn. 68 This influence is evidenced by the initial drafts of
the UCC which explicitly refer to these concepts. In addition, these
concepts and Llewellyn's works, especially the UCC, seem to
agree.369
It is unsurprising that Llewellyn, who argued long and forcefully
that law should apply the teachings of contemporary social science,
actually did so when he drafted a proposed statute. That Llewellyn's
proposal was the basis of the present commercial law does not
change this but makes it more historically interesting. Why then,
are Commons, Veblen, Boas, the NIRA, Sumner, Isaacs, Hamilton,
Modernism, FDR, and the NLRA, not discussed by present commercial law scholars? How or why was all this learning lost?
Unquestionably, this learning has been lost because the early
writings leading up to the UCC have been ignored by commercial
law scholars and commentators. 7 ° Social thought from 1925 to
1940 has been generally ignored by commercial law scholars. For
example, most books discussing regulation fail to mention the
thirties. 71 Legal thinkers, in fact, seem to replow the same
.8 See supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.
369 For example, the collectivism of Commons and the group anthropology of Boas and
Sumner fits with the UCC's employment of trade usage in the Sales Article. See COMMONS,
supra note 98, at 5-6; BOAS, supra note 83, at 11-16; SUMNER, supra note 129, at 12-13.
30 UCC commentators ignore works prior to the fifties. For example, White and Summers

do not mention these scholars. See generally White, supra note 11; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra
note 51.
37' See STEPHEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982) (failing to list Keynes,
Commons, Veblen, Roosevelt, Arnold, or Frank in its index); PHILLIP AREEDA, ANTITRUST
ANALYSIS (3d ed. 1981) (failing to mention the NRA); ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST
PARADox: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 56 (1978) (containing little discussion of the thirties
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ground as the between-the-wars academics, without realizing it.
There are four possible explanations for this neglect.
A.

The Change in Academic Fashion

One possible explanation why these ideas have been overlooked is
that academic thought changed in the forties, when new topics,
approaches, and thinkers, like Keynes, came into vogue. A symbol
of this change is the fact that Ronald Coase, a present-day Libertarian and Nobel Prize-winning Chicago economist, was a socialist
in the thirties.3 7 2 In the fifties, scholarship became narrowly
focused, formal, morally-neutral, and ahistorical. In economics, the
collectivism of the institutionalists was replaced by Keynesian and
Moreover, FDR adopted Keynesian
neo-classical thought.37 3
economics.3 74 A new macro-economic paradigm replaced that of
the NIRA.375
Jurisprudential thought also changed. The "Process" and the
"Reasoned Elaboration" schools emerged to replace Legal
Realism.37 6 With the Supreme Court's civil rights decisions, the
attention shifted to the Bill of Rights, the courts, the civil rights
lawyers and constitutional law scholars.3 77 Thus, starting in the

late thirties there was a change in both theoretical and applied
economics, sociology, and jurisprudence.

antitrust policy). Bork viewed Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933),
which upheld the trade association activities of coal producers and which contains much of the
era's theory of demoralization of industry, as a routine cartel case. See also FOUNDATIONS OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAw (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1994) (failing to include one article discussing the
New Deal, even though it is a collection of writings on administrative law).
372 Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J.
1211, 1211 n.1 (1991).
...See COMMONS, supra note 98, at 52; WHITE, supra note 62, at'3-4.
174 See FREIDEL, supra note 189, at 64.
...See Hovenkamp, supra note 65, at 1038. Professor Hovenkamp described how in
academic economics, Coase and Pareto come in vogue: "Under ordinalism, the ideology of
neoclassical welfare economics moved very far to the right. For the ordinalist, voluntary
transactions could be scientifically shown to enhance welfare. Forced wealth transfers
generally could not be, and came to be perceived as reflecting nothing more than politics." Id.
See also Herbert Hovenkamp, EvolutionaryModels In Jurisprudence,64 TEx. L. REV. 645, 682
n.206 (1985). Hovenkamp described how sociology changed after the heroic age of sociology
of the twenties and thirties which was concerned with the creation of the best society. Afterwards, sociologists tended to practice micro-sociology, studying discrete social phenomena,
such as the "socialization in infants.' Id.
376 See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE
4-7 (1991) (describing the shift in academic emphasis from economic regulation to rights).
377 Id.
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Llewellyn, however, did not make this change. Instead, Llewellyn
continued to view the world in terms of the business commonwealth
and the older anthropology and sociology. 78 Llewellyn's response
3 79
to the "rights revolution" and Brown v.Board of Education
is
instructive. Faced with integration, Llewellyn embarrassingly
applied Sumner's concepts of "folkways" to the civil rights
movement.380
Just as Llewellyn did not understand the rights activists, the
activists did not, and still do not, understand Llewellyn. For
example, consumer rights advocates do not understand why
Llewellyn did not put more consumer protections into the UCC."8 '
Llewellyn's vision was different from today's "rights talk."
Whereas rights advocates view society in terms of powerless
individuals who are oppressed and exploited by powerful
institutions, Llewellyn, Commons, and the believers in the business

378 See LLEWELLYN, supra note 154, at 515-16 (studying appellate decision making as "small

group behavior" and as a type of anthropological style).
379 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
380 See Racial Peace, supra note 134, at 31. Llewellyn indicated:
In any event, three things seem very clear. The first is that the machinery of lawgovernment has no need to lag behind or to lag with or to uncreatively just fit into
the existing ways of people in their race relations, whether inside a nation or
between nations. On the contrary the machinery of law-government can be built (as
has been done in part by our Constitution and by our Supreme Court and by our
system of armed services and of elections) to set up ideals still far from full
attainment, to set up tension, steady or sudden, in the direction of those ideals, and
in some degree to block off or to beat down obstruction. But the second thing is no
less clear: put tension on too suddenly, too sharply, too hard, and your wire can
snap, can even snap back into that devastation called destruction and reaction. It
is a fine trite truth that the art of statesmanship lies in finding workable measures,
in introducing them with patient skill, in following them through with firmness, and
with courage, and also with tact.
Id. at 31. Llewellyn goes on to balance racial justice with the probable resistances offered by
local folkways when he stated:
Hospitals:(which I think could be made today into regulated public utilities, at
least for purposes of anti-discrimination.) As to patients, admissions to private
rooms raise problems no more serious than the "outrage" felt years back by people
with "real cars" and "real" status when Ford began to pay "mere" workmen five
dollars a day and to let us ordinary folk climb into Model-T's; while emergency work
and wards entail an element of common suffering that goes some distance toward
an even deeper common feeling than that of "team."
Much more troubling is the matter of professional staff, where the limited
facilities and opportunities produce a bottle-neck not unlike that envisaged above in
regard to industry in a depression.
Id. at 34.
...See Zipporah B. Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the MerchantRules,
100 HARv. L. REV. 465, 519 (1987) (criticizing Llewellyn for failing to protect consumers more).
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commonwealth saw society as working groups engaged in commerce.
Moreover, in as much as consumer groups want to empower
consumers individually, Llewellyn wanted to empower merchants
collectively. Thus, part of the explanation for the forgetfulness of
the past is that academic trends have changed.3" 2
B.

Complexity of Academic Works

Another possible explanation for the forgetfulness is that Llewellyn and his contemporaries were, and still are, difficult to
understand.
Llewellyn and Commons wrote in an extremely
complex, elusive, and convoluted style. Compounding this problem
was Llewellyn's distaste for citation, especially in the Code comments. Although contemporary literature of the twenties and
thirties indicates that few, if any, of Llewellyn's ideas were unique,
Llewellyn never credited such sources which makes it extremely
difficult to pinpoint the sources he relied on.
One wonders if Llewellyn adopted his style as camouflage. Even
though Llewellyn was a modernist, collectivist and a reformer who
supported FDR and the New Deal, he still had to relate to and sell
his ideas to the conservative commercial bar, The American Law
Institute, and The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
Therefore, it is probable that Llewellyn intentionally wrote his
articles in a manner that concealed his radicalism.8"
Moreover, in Llewellyn's discussions of the UCC, he did not refer
to institutionalism, anthropology, or collectivism, but took on the
style of the commercial lawyer. Therefore, the UCC was presented
as merely an improvement on the Sales Act and not a radical
change. By pretending that the UCC was only a codification of the
prior better commercial decisions, Llewellyn has misled many.
C. Schechter Poultry's Effect on Institutionalism
A third possible explanation for this neglect is that
institutionalism never entered main-stream legal case analysis, in

882 See Schlegel, supra note 31, at 195 (suggesting that "American Legal Realism simply ran

itself into the sand" and thereby got lost in the general legal milieu).
S See, e.g., Contract,supra note 48, at 751. Llewellyn stated that "[olverwhelming is the
realization of how far a law still built in the ideology of Adam Smith has been meshed into the
new order of mass-production, mass-relationships." Id. A leftist could interpret this passage

as viewing laissez-faire economics as passe. A conservative might interpret it as stating that
the principles of freedom of contract were being built into modern law.
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part, because Schechter Poultry, for reasons peculiar to legal
scholarship, diverted attention away from institutionalism. In
addition to invalidating the NIRA, Schechter Poultry also rejected
any direct granting of sovereign power to groups. Thus, legal
devices after SchechterPoultry had to indirectly delegate this power,
like the UCC, through captive administrative agencies or by making
group norms part of individual bargaining.
This bar on direct group empowerment had a peculiar effect
because of how legal scholarship works. To a large extent, both
legal scholarship and teaching are case intensive. As Schechter
Poultry prevented legislation directly empowering groups from being
passed, there were also no cases interpreting such legislation to
teach or write about. Moreover, no one reads law review articles
from the thirties anymore. Thus, an entire theme in prior legal
thought is passed over.
D.

Traumatic Injury

Finally, traumatic events during the forties and fifties created a
collective amnesia about the ideas of the thirties. World War II and
McCarthyism were two such traumatic events. World War II forced
a moral choice and compelled an end to the Legal Realists' skepticism and their scientific detachment from moral issues. 8 " The
amoral style of Realism became, at best, a mistake.3 85 As a result,

...See FRANK, supra note 30, at 3-7. Pearl Harbor made obsolete Frank's argument that
America should concentrate on economic issues and ignore foreign wars; see also COMMONS,
supranote 98, at 903 (stating amorally: "Yet it is doubtful whether, under modern conditions,
a decision can be reached as to which is the better public policy-the Communism of Russia,
the Fascism of Italy, or the Banker Capitalism of the United States").
Llewellyn statements in the thirties also showed a moral neutrality. See LLEWELLYN, supra
note 154, at 468-75. Similar to Commons and Frank, Llewellyn stated that
An authoritarian system can and does handle a moderately effective shaping of its
children by the million. Whatever troubles Russia has today, the generation of
young Russians have lost Tsarist Russia forever. Whatever troubles Germany has
or will have, the young Germans are, as a people, being effectively made into a
different people from that of pre-Hitler days.
Id. at 468.
8 See White, supra note 11, at 140. White opined that the rapid decline of the Realist's
influence
was a perceived relationship between their moral relativism and the rise of amoral
totalitarian governments. Frightened by the spectre of Nazi Germany and Fascist
Italy, American intellectuals sought a means of distinguishing their culture from
that of those regimes. One apparently clear distinction, they found, was the
presence in America of pervasive moral ideals, such as liberty and democracy. These
ideals were absolutes in that they served to define the nature of American

HeinOnline -- 59 Alb. L. Rev. 394 1995-1996

1995]

Between-the-Wars Social Thought

many philosophical bases of the UCC were rejected or at least
forgotten.3 " 6
After World War II, the collectivist, anti-laissez-faireideals of the
thirties faced the new challenge of McCarthyism. Any admission or
hint that the new proposed commercial code was even remotely
based on collectivist theories or that it worked against individual
bargaining would have been disastrous.3 7
As we have seen, freedom of contract, or at least an individual's
freedom of contract, is not a principle of the UCC.3 88 A merchant's

freedom to bargain is hemmed in by "reasonableness," the standard
of good faith, the use of standard terms and meanings... and nondisclaimable usage of trade. The UCC, however, could not explicitly
recognize these. The UCC was proposed for adoption in the fifties,
which was the worst time to mention the Code's bias against
individual bargaining. Therefore, the UCC's explicit references to
freedom of contract were added in the fifties for political
39
reasons. 0
Not only would it be impolitic to mention the UCC's intellectual
roots, it would also be irrelevant. After the war, American society
and commerce were different. The pre-war era was characterized by
shifting price levels, widespread commercial collapse, bankruptcy,
and an accompanying conclusion that traditional law was inade-

civilization; yet the Realists were asserting the relativistic nature of morals and
ethics and championing pragmatism. It was not difficult, pursuing this line of
reasoning; to see Realism as an intellectual precursor to totalitarianism.
Id.

386 See CASABLANCA (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1942). The cultural icon exemplifying America's
rejection of the thirties' hard-boiled realism is Rick in Casablanca. One could no longer
practice a trade and be concerned solely with issues of money-making. "The problems of the
world are not in my department. I'm a saloon-keeper." One had to make a moral choice. "[Ilt
all adds up to one thing. You're getting on that plane with Victor where you belong." Id.
38 See COMMONS, supra note 66, at 131.
38 See White, supra note 11, at 40-41 (noting that after 1937 freedom of contract was seen
to be a thing of the past).
'89 Examples of standard terms are F.O.B., which means "free on board," and C.I.F., which
means "cost, insurance and freight." DICTIONARY OF LEGAL ABBREVIATIONS (1993).
" NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, Uniform
Commercial Code: ProposedFinal Draft No. 2 (1951), reprinted in 12 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE DRAFTS 1, 26 (Elizabeth S. Kelly ed., 1984). Section 1-102(2)(b)'s "continued expansion
of commercial practices and mechanisms through custom, usage and agreement of the parties"
was added in 1951. Id. That section's comment, proposed in 1955, reads: "subsection (3)
states affirmatively, and at the outset, that freedom of contract is a principle of the Code."
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, Supplement No. 1 to
the 1952 official Draft of Text and Comments of the Uniform Commercial Code (1955),
reprinted in 17 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE DRAFTS 307, 321 (Elizabeth S. Kelly ed., 1984).
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quate. However, since the United States economy was the most
successful in the world after World War II, there was no reason to
change the way things were being done. Although the UCC still
bore the traces of pre-war social philosophy, that philosophy was
outmoded.
VIII.

THE UCC AS A PARADIGM

The UCC may also be viewed as a paradigm. The UCC's rise is
similar to the scientific revolutions described by Thomas Kuhn.39 '
Kuhn theorized that the received wisdom, the paradigm, breaks
down with the growth of perceived anomalies. The experimental
results do not fit the accepted theories of the time. A time of stress,
conflict, debate, and creativity, follows until a new structure or
paradigmatic theory emerges. This then becomes the accepted
wisdom and scientists again practice normal science which involves
proving and working out minor conflicts in the dominant theory.392
Paradigm theory fits the UCC's creation and later explication.
The Depression was the time of anomaly. The traditional legal
framework was obviously incapable of working, achieving prosperity,
or structuring viable commerce. As indicated, the Depression was
a period of new ideas, debates on fundamental principles, radical
rejection of old concepts, and proposals for new order. Once the new
order was set in place, however, lawyers and professors set about
practicing, teaching, and analyzing normal law. Commercial law
was no longer a debate on the fundamentals, but about the microconflicts and problems generated by the new paradigm-the UCC.
The leading commercial law scholars were therefore those who could
micro-analyze the UCC.
Thus, the new age belonged to a
managerial rather than a creative elite.
Today we practice normal science in commercial law scholarship
and work out the minor problems in the UCC. However, a typical
393
twenties or thirties law review would discuss philosophy,
institutionalism, 94 current sales law, 95 proposals for granting

"' See generallyTHOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRuCTURE OF THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1970).
.9 Examples of this are the replacement of Newtonian physics with Einstein's theory of
relativity and the replacement of the geo-syncline geology by plate-tectonics.
...See generally Cohen, supra note 71.
.. See John R. Commons, Law and Economics, 34 YALE L.J. 371, 372-75 (1925).

...See generally Isaacs, supra note 183 (criticizing the Uniform Sales Act).
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sovereign power to economic groups, 3 96 and even social
revolution.3 9 7
Like his contemporaries, Llewellyn's language was metaphorical,
poetic, and concerned with basic issues. The language
of the
39
interpreters of the Code is precise, dry, and analytical.
The commercial law scholars and experts we consult today, such
as White, Summers, and Nordstrom, are the heirs of the betweenthe-war thinkers who created the system. As successors, their job
was to perfect the UCC and explain its internal workings. However,
they were and still are not concerned about the UCC's basic
premises. We have taken the UCC's structure for granted for too
long.

3 See Jaffe, supra note 115.
.. See generally Robinson, supra note 69.
398 See Contract, supra note 48, at 751. Compare Llewellyn's following conclusion with any
page of White and Summers:
One turns from contemplation of the work of contract as from the experience of
Greek tragedy. Life struggling against form, or through form to its will--"pity and
terror-." Law means so pitifully little to life. Life is so terrifyingly dependent on
the law.
Marginal cases, hospital cases, most of our cases well may be. Much doctrine,
however sweetly spun, serves chiefly to grow grey with dust against the rafters.
Overwhelming is the certainty that any synthesis which is to match with the
meaning of the law in life must expand beyond the futile limits set by present legal
theory to include great blocks of what we know as property, and equity, and
remedies, to cover as well the most significant parts of business associations, and
who knows what besides. Overwhelming is the realization of how far a law still
built in the ideology of Adam Smith has been meshed into the new order of massproduction, mass-relationships. Overwhelming in no less measure is the conviction
that broad forms of words are chaos, that only in close study of the facts salvation
lies.
Against these conclusions stand others. The ad hoc approach of case-law courts
is sane, it cuts close to need, it lives, it grows. And the work of law and lawyers in
the contract field, however little of the whole it constitutes, has vital meaning. It
is both hinge and key of readjustment. And how, without it, shall the great gate
swing open?
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